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Patent Law Viewed Through an Evidentiary Lens: 
The “Suggestion Test” as a Rule of Evidence 
Christopher A. Cotropia∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Patent quality in the United States is the subject of much recent 
discussion.1 There is a general sentiment that many of the inventions 
for which patents are issued and successfully enforced do not meet 
the requirement of patentability. The existence and enforcement of 
these patents hampers competition and, in the end, hurts the 
consumer.2 Stories of patent holding companies harassing honest 
businesses with invalid patents are becoming commonplace in the 
popular press.3 The existence of these “trolls,”4 and the bad patents 
 
 ∗ Associate Professor of Law, Intellectual Property Institute, University of Richmond 
School of Law. I would like to thank Graeme Dinwoodie, Cynthia Ho, Tim Holbrook, Mark 
Lemley, Greg Mandel, Joe Miller, Jonathan Nash, Rafael Pardo, Arti Rai, Matt Sag, Katherine 
Strandburg, and the participants at the Spring 2006 Chicago Intellectual Property Colloquium 
for their helpful comments and thoughts on an early draft of this Article. 
 1. See, e.g., ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: 
HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND 
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 34–35 (2004) (arguing that the patent system is broken and 
improperly creates and enforces patent rights that are too strong); Joseph Farrell & Robert P. 
Merges, Incentives To Challenge and Defend Patents: Why Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent 
Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
943, 945–46 (2004) (identifying problems with patent quality); Bronwyn H. Hall & Dietmar 
Harhoff, Post-Grant Reviews in the U.S. Patent System—Design Choices and Expected Impact, 
19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 989, 995–99 (2004) (detailing problems with the United States 
patent system that result in low patent quality); Michael S. Mireles, Jr., The United States 
Patent Reform Quagmire: A Balanced Proposal, 6 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 709, 735 (2005) 
(book review).  
 2. See Hall & Harhoff, supra note 1, at 992–94.  
 3. See, e.g., Michelle Kessler, Patent Lawsuits Hit Tech Titans, USA TODAY, Feb. 13, 
2006, at B3 (detailing the recent rise of patent suits against large companies); Rachel Laing, 
Down to Wire for Blackberry?, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Feb. 24, 2006, at A1 (discussing the 
patent infringement suit against Research-in-Motion that potentially could have caused all 
Blackberry devices to shut down). 
 4. “Patent trolls” are companies or individuals who try to “game the system” by 
obtaining patents and try to “capture not only the value of their inventions, but the value of 
complementary assets and irreversible investments made by” others. Mark A. Lemley, 
Patenting Nanotechnology, 58 STAN. L. REV. 601, 630 (2005). 
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they seek to enforce, suggests the United States patent system is not 
working. In fact, the perceived desperate state of the patent system is 
getting congressional attention, causing the most significant patent 
reform bill since 1952 to be introduced in Congress this past 
legislative session.5 
The focus of much of the criticism is on a particular requirement 
for patentability—nonobviousness.6 The nonobviousness require-
ment in patent law has been termed the “ultimate condition for 
patentability.”7 It ensures that “even if an invention is new and 
useful,” that invention represents a measurable technological advance 
beyond what has already been done.8 Only those inventions warrant 
patent protection. The requirement carries most of the burden of 
maintaining a balance in patent law between providing an incentive 
for inventions to be created while not protecting so many minor 
inventions that protection becomes socially harmful.9 Most recent 
commentary and criticism regarding nonobviousness focuses on the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the court 
that exclusively handles appeals in patent cases.10 The main thrust of 
this criticism is that the Federal Circuit has relaxed the 
nonobviousness requirement, thereby allowing too much patent 
protection and, as a result, harming innovation. The criticism is 
directed at recent Federal Circuit jurisprudence and its alleged 
modification of the nonobviousness standard. 
 
 5. See Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 6. Nonobviousness is also a common target for the popular press’s critiques of the 
patent system, evidenced by the numerous articles that use the phrase “patently obvious” in 
their titles. See, e.g., Reed Hundt, Patently Obvious, FORBES, Jan. 30, 2006, at 36. 
 7. See NONOBVIOUSNESS—THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY (John F. 
Witherspoon ed., 1980). 
 8. See Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic 
Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 803, 812 (1988). 
 9. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF 
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY ch. 4, at 6–7 (2003) (asserting that a “but for” 
test instituted by the nonobviousness requirement ensures a proper balance between patent 
protection and competition). 
 10. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4) (2000) (giving the Federal Circuit exclusive appellate 
authority over patent appeals). But see Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., 
Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 834 (2002) (limiting the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction); 
Christopher A. Cotropia, “Arising Under” Jurisdiction and Uniformity in Patent Law, 9 
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 253, 286–302 (2003) (explaining how the Holmes 
decision disturbed the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction). 
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Recent criticism includes two highly publicized reports—one by 
the Federal Trade Commission in 2003 and another by the National 
Research Council in 2004.11 In addition, the Federal Circuit’s 
nonobviousness case law is the subject of a highly publicized case 
pending before the Supreme Court—KSR International Co. v. 
Teleflex, Inc.12 The Petitioner, KSR, is supported by intellectual 
property law professors, economists, legal historians, many Fortune 
500 technology companies, and the Solicitor General.13 
Furthermore, the Federal Circuit’s nonobviousness jurisprudence has 
been the subject of multiple academic articles asserting the court 
improperly applies the doctrine.14 
All of this criticism of the Federal Circuit’s case law focuses, in 
one form or another, on the “suggestion test” part of the 
nonobviousness analysis. The suggestion test requires a finding that 
there was some suggestion before the invention’s creation to 
combine or modify the prior art—things that have already been 
done—in such a way as to make the claimed invention.15 The 
suggestion test is meant to discern whether there already was a 
suggestion to create what is claimed to be patentable, and thus, 
patent protection was not needed to prompt the invention’s 
creation. 
The Federal Circuit is said to improperly limit the suggestion test 
inquiry. The court requires a suggestion to come from the prior art 
itself. Other commonly accepted sources of undocumented 
 
 11. See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 9; COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. 
RIGHTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECON. ET AL., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY (Stephen A. Merrill, Richard C. Levin & Mark B. Myers eds., 2004). 
 12. 126 S. Ct. 2965, 2965 (2006) (granting certiorari). 
 13. See, e.g., Brief of Intellectual Property Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioner, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., No. 04-1350 (U.S. Aug. 22, 2006), 2006 WL 
2452369 [hereinafter Brief of IP Professors]; Brief of Economists and Legal Historians as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Teleflex, No. 04-1350 (U.S. Aug. 22, 2006), 2006 WL 
2452359; Brief of Amici Curiae Cisco Sys. Inc. et al. in Support of Reversal, KSR Int’l Co. v. 
Teleflex, Inc., No. 04-1350 (U.S. Aug. 22, 2006), 2006 WL 2452365 [hereinafter Cisco 
Brief]; Brief for Amici Curiae Time Warner Inc. et al. in Support of Petitioner, Teleflex, No. 
04-1350 (U.S. Aug. 22, 2006), 2006 WL 2452363; Brief of Intel Corp. & Micron Tech., Inc. 
as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Teleflex, No. 04-1350 (U.S. Aug. 22, 2006), 2006 
WL 2453606; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Teleflex, 
No. 04-1350 (U.S. Aug. 22, 2006), 2006 WL 2453601s. 
 14. See, e.g., Rebecca Eisenberg, Obvious to Whom? Evaluating Inventions from the 
Perspective of PHOSITA, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 885 (2004). 
 15. See Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654, 665 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
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suggestions, such as the common knowledge of those skilled in the 
relevant technology or the nature of the problem the invention is 
solving, are ignored. This “narrow” suggestion test focuses solely on 
the prior art. Commentators contend that the narrow suggestion test 
relaxes the nonobviousness requirement because it limits the grounds 
upon which a suggestion can be found. As a result, the narrow 
suggestion test allows obvious inventions to be improperly found 
nonobvious and receive patent protection. Critics, therefore, call for 
a full, broader application of the suggestion test that considers other 
factual bases for suggestion—a “broad” suggestion test. One should 
be allowed to rely on the knowledge in the art or the nature of the 
problem being solved—undocumented suggestions—to render an 
invention obvious. 
This Article tests the validity of this criticism and finds that the 
Federal Circuit has not narrowed the suggestion test. By taking a 
novel look at the jurisprudence, this Article concludes that the court 
has instead adopted an evidentiary-like aspect of the suggestion test. 
Those cases where it appears the court is focusing only on the prior 
art are actually instances where the court is exercising an evidentiary 
aspect of the suggestion test. The suggestion test’s “rule of 
evidence” excludes undocumented evidence of suggestion that does 
not contain the requisite detail and analysis. This rule of evidence is 
tailored to adjust the level of detail and analysis required to 
correspond to the complexity of the technology at issue. As a result, 
the suggestion test’s rule of evidence helps to reduce overvaluation 
of suggestion evidence and the resulting, incorrect obviousness 
determinations. However, the rule may produce some erroneous 
nonobviousness determinations of its own, particularly at the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”), and thus should be 
relaxed in this context. Finally, this use of an evidentiary lens to look 
at, and evaluate, patent doctrine has application in patent law far 
beyond nonobviousness and the suggestion test. 
This Article reaches these conclusions in the following manner. It 
first focuses on the Federal Circuit’s recent usage of the suggestion 
test.16 Specifically, a descriptive study will concentrate on recent 
Federal Circuit cases addressing nonobviousness.17 The specific focus 
 
 16. The particulars of the descriptive study are detailed in Part IV of this Article. See 
infra Part IV and notes 101–04. 
 17. Id. 
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of the descriptive inquiry will be the contours of the suggestion test 
the court uses. 
The initial results of this study are mixed. There are clearly cases 
where the court ignores all grounds for suggestion other than prior 
art. Cases such as Teleflex, which is currently pending before the 
Supreme Court, provide good examples of the court apparently 
using a narrow suggestion test.18 However, just as many cases are 
found where the court uses the traditional, broad suggestion test. 
For example, in Princeton Biochemicals, Inc. v. Beckman Coulter, 
Inc., the court based its finding of suggestion on knowledge in the 
art and the nature of the problem being solved.19 Both narrow and 
broad suggestion test cases can be found in appeals from patent 
infringement decisions by district courts and appeals from final 
rejections of patent applications by the USPTO. 
As a result of this initial finding, this Article then takes a second 
look at this apparent conflict in the substantive law of the suggestion 
test.20 Instead of focusing on whether the narrow suggestion test is 
the result of a change in substantive law, this Article asks whether the 
results in those cases are the product of an evidentiary-like rule. That 
is, does the suggestion test also have an evidentiary component? 
In order to test this hypothesis, this Article compares the 
undocumented evidence of suggestion the Federal Circuit accepts 
and rejects in the narrow and broad suggestion test cases. From this 
comparison, a clear “rule of evidence” emerges.21 The Federal 
Circuit has never deviated from the substance of the traditional, 
broad suggestion test, as critics argue. Instead, the court has given 
the suggestion test an evidentiary-like aspect that excludes certain 
types of undocumented suggestion evidence. What are thought by 
critics to be instances where the court would accept only prior art as 
evidence of suggestion are really situations where the undocumented 
suggestion evidence did not meet the suggestion test’s rule of 
evidence. That undocumented suggestion evidence was therefore not 
considered, leaving only prior art for consideration. 
 
 18. See Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int’l Co., 119 F. App’x 282 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 19. 411 F.3d 1332, 1338–39 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 20. See infra Part V. 
 21. The phrase “rule of evidence” is used as shorthand to emphasize the evidentiary-like 
features of the aspect of the suggestion test being discussed. The phrase is not used to indicate 
that this part of the suggestion test behaves in every way like a true rule of evidence. See infra 
note 197.  
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The suggestion test’s rule of evidence requires testimony on 
undocumented suggestions to be both detailed and thorough in its 
analysis. The level of detail and analysis required varies with the level 
of technological complexity of the invention at issue. The more 
complex the invention, the greater detail and analysis needed for the 
undocumented suggestion evidence to be “admissible.” As the 
sophistication of the invention decreases, so do the evidentiary 
requirements. 
Once the suggestion test’s rule of evidence is articulated, this 
Article performs a normative analysis of the rule.22 In particular, the 
rule is evaluated to see if it furthers the substantive goals of the 
nonobviousness doctrine. This analysis is performed by looking at 
the rule under evidence theory. Specifically, the rule is evaluated to 
see if it prevents overvaluation of undocumented suggestion 
evidence. The rule does prevent overvaluation by both mitigating the 
effects of hindsight bias and increasing the reliability of admitted 
testimony on suggestion. By mitigating overvaluation, the rule 
reduces the number of erroneous findings of obviousness (Type I 
errors).23 
However, the rule does nothing to reduce incorrect conclusions 
of nonobviousness (Type II errors).24 The overvaluation the rule 
prevents only creates improper conclusions of suggestion, and thus 
obviousness, failing to work in the other direction. Furthermore, the 
rule may introduce Type II errors of its own by hampering one’s 
ability to prove obviousness by reducing the universe of evidence 
that can be used to establish an undocumented suggestion. 
However, the likelihood of Type II errors is diminished by the 
tailoring the rule performs, ensuring that in those instances where 
concern of an obvious patent issuing are at their highest, the 
evidentiary requirement for an undocumented suggestion is at its 
lowest. Still, a lessening of the evidentiary standard in the USPTO 
setting would further minimize the possibility of Type II errors 
without hampering the rule’s ability to prevent Type I errors. 
This Article concludes by identifying other areas of patent law 
that may benefit from a similar, evidentiary focused analysis. Two 
 
 22. See infra Part VI. 
 23. Type I errors are false-positives, which, in the context of this Article, are incorrect 
conclusions of obviousness. Cf. infra note 271.  
 24. Type II errors are false-negatives, which, in the context of this Article, are incorrect 
conclusions of nonobviousness. Cf. infra note 271.  
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specific areas are discussed: claim interpretation and inventorship. 
Both areas have evidentiary-like rules that can be better described 
and analyzed through an evidentiary lens. This Article’s focus on 
evidence law not only helps inform and further the nonobviousness 
discussion, it can also assist in further study of patent law in general. 
II. NONOBVIOUSNESS AND THE “SUGGESTION TEST” 
In order to obtain a patent in the United States or successfully 
enforce a patent in district court, the patent must claim an invention 
that meets the patentability requirements.25 The claimed invention 
must be directed towards patentable subject matter26 and be useful 
and novel.27 The patent must also describe the claimed invention and 
enable those of ordinary skill in the relevant technology to practice 
the invention.28 Finally, the claimed invention must be nonobvious.29 
The final requirement for patentability—nonobviousness—is the 
focus of this Article. 
A. Purpose of the Nonobviousness Requirement 
At the core of the United States patent system is the right to 
exclude. With patent protection comes the ability to exclude others 
from making and using a protected invention.30 One of the major 
concerns such protection presents is the “underuse of the invention 
due to patent monopolies.”31 The power of exclusion a patent gives 
its owner can lead to “higher prices for and underutilization of the 
 
 25. See 35 U.S.C. § 131 (2000) (noting that the USPTO will examine patent 
applications to see if the “applicant is entitled to a patent under the law”); id. § 282 (noting 
that invalidity is a defense to a patent infringement action); Scott R. Boalick, Patent Quality 
and the Dedication Rule, 11 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 215, 225–30 (2004) (detailing the 
requirements for patentability). 
 26. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981) (noting that Congress intended 
for patent protection to extend to statutory subject matter that included “anything under the 
sun that is made by man” (quoting S. Rep. No. 1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. Rep. No. 1923, at 6 
(1952), as reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N.)).  
 27. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–102 (setting forth the utility and novelty requirements).  
 28. See id. § 112 (setting forth the written description and enablement requirements). 
The patent must also describe the best method of practicing the invention known to the 
inventor at the time of the patent’s filing. See id. 
 29. See id. § 103 (setting forth the nonobviousness requirement).  
 30. See id. § 271(a). 
 31. See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent 
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 868 (1990) (detailing the downside to patent protection and 
utilizing economic tools to analyze the pros and cons of patent protection). 
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patented process or product during the period of exclusion.”32 
Exclusion, therefore, introduces certain social costs that are not 
present when patent protection is absent. These “costs that arise ex 
post from exclusion” are acceptable if the resulting benefits from the 
ex ante incentives of patent protection prove to be greater.33 Patent 
protection becomes cost beneficial in situations where it is needed to 
prompt an invention’s creation and the invention it induces is of a 
level of social value that exceeds the costs associated with exclusion. 
The nonobviousness requirement is meant to maintain the 
optimal balance between the benefits and harms of patent 
protection.34 An invention must be new and useful to qualify for 
patent protection.35 But nonobviousness, the “final gatekeeper of the 
patent system,”36 requires more—the invention must also be “a 
significant enough technical advance to merit the award of a 
patent.”37 The requirement attempts to measure the “technical 
accomplishment reflected in an invention,” and in turn make sure 
that patents cover subject matter that is more than a mere “trivial 
step forward in the art.”38 
The nonobviousness requirement for patentability also “ask[s] 
whether an invention would likely emerge in roughly the same time 
frame—that is, without significant delay—‘but for’ the prospect of 
the patent.”39 Patents should be granted only for those inventions 
that would have not been created but for the incentive of patent 
protection. The nonobviousness doctrine implements this “but for” 
test by ensuring that patent protection is not given to inventions in 
 
 32. 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 3.01 (2002). 
 33. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Patent Law, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court: A 
Quiet Revolution, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 41 (2004). 
 34. Because of this aspect of the requirement, it has been termed the “ultimate 
condition of patentability.” See NONOBVIOUSNESS—THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF 
PATENTABILITY, supra note 7.  
 35. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–102. 
 36. Merges, supra note 8, at 812. 
 37. ROBERT MERGES & JOHN DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 644 (3d ed. 2002); Merges, supra note 8, at 812 (“[The] requirement asks 
whether an invention is a big enough technical advance.”). 
 38. Merges, supra note 8, at 812 (emphasis omitted). 
 39. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 9, ch. 4, at 6–7 (asserting that this “but for” test 
instituted by the nonobviousness requirement ensures a proper balance between patent 
protection and competition).  
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those instances where “others would have developed the idea even 
without the incentive of a patent.”40 
Without the nonobviousness requirement, the patent system 
would introduce more social harm than good. First, if merely trivial 
technological advances were patentable, the system would provide 
incentives for the creation of inventions that arguably produce little 
to no social value. This would skew the patent system’s incentive 
structure—focusing would-be inventors on minor developments as 
opposed to significant technological advances. In turn, these 
“economically insignificant patents” would clog the inventive 
pathways to highly beneficial technological advances.41 Exclusive 
control over these minor developments would act as roadblocks, 
creating disincentives to future inventors. Many patents on small 
technical advances make it extremely difficult and “expensive to 
search and to license” these patents in order to produce further 
innovations.42 These high costs will either prevent the public from 
enjoying certain technologies altogether because they will never be 
commercialized, or be passed along to the public in the form of 
higher prices. 
Second, even if an invention reaches the requisite level of 
technological merit, conditions may be such that the invention 
would have been created and disseminated in the absence of patent 
protection. In such a situation, providing exclusivity over subject 
matter that fails the “but for” test introduces the costs of exclusivity 
when such costs did not need to be imposed. Thus, “eliminating the 
nonobviousness requirement may impose some social loss by 
granting patents to innovations that would have been discovered and 
disclosed even without the inducement of a patent.”43 
Nonobviousness, therefore, represents a substantial and 
significant barrier to protection under the United States patent 
system.44 The doctrine plays a central role in deciding which 
 
 40. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 37, at 646; see also Lunney, supra note 33, at 50–51.  
 41. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 37, at 646–47; see also Christopher A. Cotropia, 
“After-Arising” Technologies and Tailoring Patent Scope, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 151, 
178–85 (2005) (detailing how patent protection can deter would be follow-on inventors). 
 42. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 9, ch. 4, at 3 (quoting MERGES & DUFFY, supra 
note 37, at 647). 
 43. Lunney, supra note 33, at 38. 
 44. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., E-Obviousness, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 
363, 370 (2001). 
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inventions are patentable—and therefore get a limited period of 
exclusivity—and those that get no protection. Its effective and 
proper enforcement is crucial to maintaining the social cost-benefit 
balance the patent system attempts to implement. 
Standing in the way of such proper implementation is the 
difficulty of articulating the doctrine for usage by the courts, the 
USPTO, patentees, and other patent observers.45 What standard or 
rule can ensure that both of the determinations already discussed—
that an invention reaches a particular level of technical advancement 
and that the invention would not have been created but for the 
incentives of the system—are properly and easily made by these 
patent players? Articulating the goals of the doctrine is fairly easy. 
Crafting a requirement to effectuate these goals is much more 
difficult. 
B. Modern Implementation of the Nonobviousness Requirement 
There is a significant amount of important history leading up to 
the creation of the modern nonobviousness requirement.46 For the 
purposes of this Article, however, the discussion will begin with the 
codification of the nonobviousness requirement at 35 U.S.C. § 103 
by the 1952 Patent Act.47 This statute was meant to “structure 
judicial thinking about obviousness” and place the requirement on 
“more solid footing.”48 The statutory test for nonobviousness 
indicates that 
[a] patent may not be obtained . . . if the differences between 
the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are 
such that the subject matter as a whole would have been 
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person 
having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter 
pertains.49 
 
 45. The term “observers” is borrowed from Clarisa Long’s work in the patent area. See 
Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465, 468 (2004). 
The term “observer” is meant to capture all of those who do not own patents but “need to 
learn and comprehend the boundaries and qualities” of patents for various reasons. Id. 
 46. A short summary can be found in one of Professor Robert Merges’s works on the 
subject. See Merges, supra note 8, at 812–16 (noting the evolution from a highly abstract “test 
of invention” to the “formal,” “structure[d]” approach of 35 U.S.C. § 103). 
 47. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000). 
 48. Merges, supra note 8, at 813. 
 49. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). 
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The Supreme Court addressed this codified nonobviousness test 
in Graham v. John Deere Co.50 In Graham, the Supreme Court noted 
that § 103 “lends itself to several basic factual inquiries.”51 The 
Supreme Court explicitly articulated three such inquires: (1) 
identifying the “scope and content of the prior art,” (2) determining 
the “differences between the prior art and the claims,” and (3) 
ascertaining “the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.”52 The 
Court then indicated that “[a]gainst this background, the 
obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject matter is 
determined.”53 The Supreme Court also acknowledged that 
secondary factors, that is, objective factors such as the commercial 
success of the invention, could also be properly considered in making 
the obviousness determination.54 
In some respects, the rule of law set forth in Graham is pretty 
clear. The opinion explicitly spells out the three initial steps to any 
nonobviousness analysis. In addition, the usage of secondary 
considerations as indicia of nonobviousness is clearly noted. But, the 
decision leaves a significant gap—how does a decision-maker go 
from the result of the three initial factual inquiries to the ultimate 
conclusion of nonobviousness or obviousness?55 The Supreme 
Court’s opinion may have even foreshadowed the presence of this 
gap by noting that, even with the guidance from its opinion, 
determinations of obviousness would be difficult.56 This gap has 
been, and still is, at the center of any issue of nonobviousness 
considered by courts, the USPTO, patentees, and other patent 
observers. 
 
 50. 383 U.S. 1, 3–4 (1966). 
 51. Id. at 17. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 17–18. “These secondary considerations include evidence of commercial 
success, fulfillment of a long-felt but unsolved need, licensing to potential competitors, 
copying by an infringer, progress of the patent application through the Patent and Trademark 
Office, near-simultaneous invention by another researcher in the field, and professional 
approval by experts in the field.” Dorothy Whelan, Note, A Critique of the Use of Secondary 
Considerations in Applying the Section 103 Nonobviousness Test for Patentability, 28 B.C. L. 
REV. 357, 366 (1987). 
 55. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 9, ch. 4, at 9 & n.49 (citing Professor John 
Duffy who testified that the Graham Factors “sort of leave off at the very point you think the 
analysis should start”).  
 56. Graham, 383 U.S. at 18. 
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The Federal Circuit and its predecessor court, the Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals, established a test to fill this gap—the 
“suggestion test.”57 Once the three initial inquiries articulated in 
Graham are made, Federal Circuit case law requires a showing that 
there is some “suggestion, teaching, or motivation” that would have 
led a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine or change the 
relevant art teachings to make the patented invention.58 The 
suggestion test is a required component of any nonobviousness 
analysis in patent infringement litigation and part of the prima facie 
case of obviousness during patent examination.59 This suggestion test 
provides an analytical tool to determine when the jump can properly 
be made from defining the relevant prior art, the skill in the art, and 
differences between the art and the invention to the ultimate 
conclusion of obviousness.  
The suggestion test is formulated to further the goals of the 
nonobviousness requirement.60 First, it attempts to ensure a certain 
level of technological advancement from that already known in the 
relevant field of art. If the elements of the invention existed prior to 
the invention and a motivation or suggestion to use these elements 
to make the invention was already present, the actual creation of the 
invention is not a significant enough development to warrant patent 
protection. The suggestion test also mimics the “but for” analysis 
commonly associated with the nonobviousness inquiry. The 
suggestion test asks whether a person of ordinary skill in the art 
would have, at the time of the invention, been motivated to combine 
 
 57. See DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 5.04[1][e] (Supp. 2005). 
 58. C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1351–52 (Fed. Cir. 1998). While 
suggestion is usually discussed in the context of a suggestion to combine one or more prior art 
teachings, a suggestion may also be to simply modify a single prior art reference. See Graham, 
383 U.S. at 21–26 (finding a plow design obvious in light of a single piece of prior art); Merck 
& Co. v. Biocraft Labs., Inc., 874 F.2d 804, 807 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (finding that a single prior 
art reference is sufficient to render the innovation obvious). 
 59. See In re Thrift, 298 F.3d 1357, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2002); C.R. Bard, 157 F.3d at 
1351–52.  
 60. The suggestion test is not the only part of the nonobviousness inquiry that is meant 
to further the goals of the doctrine. For example, the secondary considerations are arguably 
tailored to further the same goals targeted by the suggestion test. See, e.g., Richard L. Robbins, 
Note, Subtests of “Nonobviousness”: A Nontechnical Approach to Patent Validity, 112 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1169, 1172–83 (1964). Others have argued that certain secondary considerations, such 
as commercial success, are “a poor indicator of patentability.” Merges, supra note 8, at 838–
59; see also Edmund W. Kitch, Graham v. John Deere Co.: New Standards for Patents, 1966 
SUP. CT. REV. 293, 330–35 (1966). 
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what was already known—the prior art teachings—in the same 
manner as the invention at issue. In other words, when such a 
suggestion or motivation was present before the invention, one can 
conclude that there was no, or very little, need for an incentive from 
the patent system to spark the creation of the invention. With little 
to no barrier to the invention’s creation due to the existence of a 
motivation or suggestion, the incentive of patent protection is not 
needed. In this environment, if the invention has some social value, 
the rents available, however minimal, from tangible property rights 
alone will likely be enough to prompt the invention’s creation.61 The 
suggestion test, along with the other parts of the Graham analysis, 
becomes a proxy for ensuring that the “but for” assumption to 
patent protection is implemented. 
The suggestion test is also used to avoid “hindsight bias” in the 
nonobviousness analysis by requiring any finding of suggestion be 
grounded in specific factual proof. The threat of a nonobvious 
invention being found to be obvious after it exists, particularly after 
the fact finder has studied it, is quite high. The nonobviousness 
analysis is inherently ex post because it necessarily takes place after 
the invention has already been created, but the question asked (Was 
the invention obvious at the time the invention was made?) is asked 
ex ante. In applying the test, the “decision-maker must step 
backward in time to a moment when the invention was unknown” to 
determine nonobviousness.62 When making determinations from this 
perspective, the patented invention should not act as a blueprint as 
to how to combine different teachings in the prior art together to 
invalidate the invention. The nonobviousness doctrine, therefore, 
asks the decision-makers to ignore what they have already learned.63 
The problem is that “[h]umans are cognitively incapable of 
ignoring what they have learned.”64 Armed with the knowledge of 
the patented invention, the skilled artisan's selection and 
combination of the prior art to make the claimed invention becomes 
 
 61. Lunney, supra note 33, at 39 (noting how tangible property rights provide some 
vehicle for the recapture of sunk costs). 
 62. Gregory Mandel, Patently Non-obvious: Empirical Demonstration that the Hindsight 
Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational 6 (1st Annual Conference on Empirical legal studies 
paper, 2006), http://ssrn.com/abstract=871684 (studying whether hindsight bias truly effects 
patent decisions). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
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much easier to comprehend. The conceptualization of the 
invention’s creation is prompted by the invention’s current existence. 
This situation creates a hindsight bias—making an invention more 
likely to appear obvious to a decision-maker. 
In order for the nonobviousness analysis to be performed 
properly and for the goals of the doctrine to stay true, the doctrine 
must take hindsight bias into account. The suggestion test is meant 
to de-bias the decision-maker.65 The suggestion test requires the 
decision-maker to ground any conclusion she may have initially 
arising from hindsight bias in specific proof. “[T]he best defense 
against the subtle but powerful attraction of a hindsight-based 
obviousness analysis is rigorous application of the requirement for a 
showing of the teaching or motivation to combine prior art 
references.”66 Without the de-biasing effects of the suggestion test, 
most inventions would be found obvious because all of the elements 
of those inventions are most likely found in the prior art and the 
invention itself will act as a road map for how these pieces of prior 
art can be put together. So the suggestion test not only furthers the 
main policies behind the nonobviousness requirement, but it also 
reduces the likelihood that the invention itself will be used against 
the inventor, biasing the decision-maker, via hindsight, into 
concluding that the invention is obvious. 
While the purposes of the suggestion test are rather easily 
understood, where such suggestions can be legitimately found is 
trickier. The Federal Circuit, in almost all of its nonobviousness 
opinions, recites three sources from which a suggestion may be 
found: (a) the prior art references themselves, (b) the knowledge of 
those of ordinary skill in the art, and (c) the nature of the problem to 
be solved.67 The first source, prior art references, is defined by statute 
and includes those technical journals, articles, and physical devices in 
existence at the time of the invention’s creation.68 Basically, this first 
 
 65. See McGinley v. Franklin Sports, Inc., 262 F.3d 1339, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“To 
prevent hindsight invalidation of patent claims, the law requires some ‘teaching, suggestion or 
reason’ to combine cited references.” (quoting Gambro Lundia AB v. Baxter Healthcare 
Corp., 110 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). 
 66. In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds 
by In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 67. Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654, 665 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 68. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000) (setting forth categories of prior art). The specific 
contours of “prior art” in patent law are a bit more nuanced than simply what was documented 
before the invention’s creation. See, e.g., id. § 102(b) (defining a category of prior art that may 
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source includes suggestions stemming from the knowledge that was 
documented at the time of the invention.69 The second and third 
sources focus on the general knowledge of, or interpretation of the 
problem being solved by, a person skilled in the relevant 
technological field at the time of the invention. These latter 
categories include suggestions coming from information that was 
undocumented at the time of the invention.70  
III. CRITICISM OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S NONOBVIOUSNESS 
JURISPRUDENCE 
Most of the recent criticism surrounding the nonobviousness 
doctrine and the Federal Circuit centers on the suggestion test.71 
Critics assert that the Federal Circuit’s implementation of the 
suggestion test has “reduce[d] the size of the step required for 
patentability—that is, reducing the rigor of the nonobviousness 
standard.”72 While some critics have called for the abolishment of the 
suggestion test altogether,73 others assert that the Federal Circuit 
improperly applies a “narrow” suggestion test by recognizing a 
suggestion or motivation to combine from only prior art 
references.74 The court should, instead, apply a “broad” suggestion 
 
be dated after the invention’s creation, but more than one year before the filing date of the 
invention’s patent application); OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396, 1401–
04 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (noting that most subsections of § 102 qualify as prior art for 
consideration in a nonobviousness analysis under § 103). 
 69. This Article will refer to this first category as “documented suggestions.” 
 70. This Article will refer to these latter two categories, collectively, as “undocumented 
suggestions.” 
 71. Criticism also focuses on the use of “commercial success” as an objective indicator 
of nonobviousness. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 9, ch. 4, at 15–19 (2003). 
Discussion of secondary considerations and the commercial success indicia are beyond the 
scope of this Article.   
 72. Id. at 8. 
 73. See, e.g., Cisco Brief, supra note 13, at 10–11. This Article will focus on the assertion 
that the Federal Circuit employs a narrow suggestion test and, thus, will not discuss the 
propriety of the abolishment or replacement of even the broad suggestion test. However, the 
normative discussion in Part VI of this Article, infra, necessarily has some application to the 
broader nonobviousness debate. 
 74. As will be explained in more detail below, critics may not identify a specific change 
to the suggestion test, just that the complete nonobviousness analysis must be based on the 
prior art and not other, undocumented information. See, e.g., Brief of IP Professors, supra note 
13, at 10–13 (“As applied in this case, the knowledge of those of ordinary skill in the art is 
used to help determine the scope and content of the applicable prior art, but there appears to 
be no room for the application of routine problem-solving skill. The nature of the problem 
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test that would allow for the consideration of both documented and 
undocumented suggestions in the search for a suggestion to 
combine.75 The usage of a narrow suggestion test produces a less 
rigorous nonobviousness standard, which, in turn, results in more 
obvious patents being issued and successfully enforced.76 Such a 
situation upsets the specific incentives the nonobviousness doctrine is 
meant to preserve and, instead, introduces social costs the patent 
system is supposed to avoid. 
Two recent reports on the United States patent system examined 
the Federal Circuit’s implementation of the suggestion test. The first 
is a 2003 report on patent law and competition written by the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC). The FTC focused, in part, on the 
Federal Circuit’s use of the suggestion test when determining 
nonobviousness.77 The FTC observed from the hearings it held that 
while the Federal Circuit articulates three sources from which a 
suggestion can arise, the “feel of the case law” is that the court 
recognizes suggestions only from the prior art and not the two other 
categories.78 Motivations must come from literal readings of the 
references, not from the knowledge in the art or the nature of the 
problem being solved.79 This narrowing of the suggestion test, the 
FTC concluded, is evidenced in both the Federal Circuit’s handling 
of appeals from patent infringement cases and decisions by the 
USPTO.80 The FTC report particularly noted that the Federal 
 
similarly serves only to motivate a search for references addressing the specific problem at 
hand.”).  
 75. This distinction between a broad and a narrow suggestion test may also be 
articulated as the difference between an explicit and implicit suggestion to combine. Such 
labels cannot be considered equivalent for the purposes of this Article. Broad versus narrow 
foci on where a suggestion may be found—either in just the prior art or also in the skill in the 
art or the nature of the problem. Explicit versus implicit speaks to how the suggestion appears 
in a given source, not a definition of the source itself. See, e.g., Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. Cal. 
Edison Co., 227 F.3d 1361, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (quoting WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int’l 
Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999)) (articulating the suggestion test as 
requiring either an “explicit or implicit teaching[]” found within any of the three commonly 
recited sources for a suggestion). 
 76. This situation will be referenced in Part VI of this Article, infra, as a “Type II 
error”—a false finding of an invention’s nonobviousness. See infra note 271. 
 77. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 9, ch. 4.  
 78. Id. at 12 (quoting testimony from Professor John Duffy). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 10–12 (“Criticisms of recent opinions focus on the rigorous manner in which 
the Federal Circuit has applied the suggestion test, rather than the totality of the court’s 
language.”).  
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Circuit requires “the [USPTO] to apply only specific and definitive 
art references with clear motivation of how to combine those 
references, and only that will suffice for this obviousness 
determination.”81 
The FTC concluded that this narrow suggestion test “rais[ed] 
the bar for finding obviousness” and, in turn, “rais[ed] competitive 
concerns.”82 By excluding skill in the art from the suggestion test 
analysis, the Federal Circuit fails to find invalid those inventions that 
fail the “but for” analysis—that would have been produced 
regardless of the incentive of patent protection. The FTC 
determined that by ignoring suggestions from the skill in the art or 
the nature of the problem solved, the Federal Circuit ignores 
evidence that could clearly suggest the invention is inevitably 
forthcoming and that patent protection—and the exclusivity that 
comes along with it—is not needed.83 A relaxed nonobviousness 
standard, in turn, creates “serious clutter problems and issues 
involving market power maintenance and extension.”84 The FTC 
recommended that the suggestion test include those undocumented 
suggestions, such as from the knowledge in the art or the nature of 
the problem being solved.85 Thus, the FTC recommended the usage 
of a broad suggestion test to put the nonobviousness requirement in 
line with its intended purpose—providing patent protection where it 
is warranted and socially beneficial. 
The FTC’s report was followed by a 2004 report on the United 
States patent system by the National Research Council (NRC).86 The 
report included seven recommendations for the current patent 
system, one of which was to “reinvigorate the non-obviousness 
standard.”87 The NRC’s discussion of this recommendation focused 
on the current nonobviousness requirement as applied in two 
 
 81. Id. (quoting the testimony of former PTO director Q. Todd Dickinson). 
 82. Id. at 13. Noting how only looking at prior art references for suggestion or 
motivation operates as a “one-way ratchet: it can help confirm obviousness, but it does not 
necessarily identify nonobviousness.” Id. at 14.  
 83. Id. at 13–14. 
 84. Id. at 9. The FTC also noted that by reading the person having ordinary skill in the 
art out of the analysis, the Federal Circuit may be ignoring the statutory mandate of § 103. Id. 
at 14 (noting that “[s]ome applications of the suggestion test, however, appear almost to have 
read PHOSITA out of the statute”).  
 85. Id. at 15. 
 86. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2004).  
 87. Id. at 87–95. 
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particular contexts: business method and gene sequence-related 
inventions.88 
In the business method section of the report, the NRC voiced 
concern that the suggestion test, in its current form, improperly 
“assume[s] that the USPTO will have access to the state of the art at 
the time the invention at issue was made.”89 In the business method 
area, published literature will unlikely fully describe the common 
knowledge or state of the art at a particular time.90 Thus, the 
USPTO cannot readily establish a prima facie case of obviousness 
during examination if it must find suggestion in a prior art reference 
because most of the skill in the business method art is not embodied 
in such references. The report also noted that the USPTO has 
limited mechanisms through which it can obtain testimony to 
establish that knowledge in the art is not found in publications.91 
Thus, the NRC’s report criticized the Federal Circuit for using a 
narrow suggestion test. 
These concerns regarding the Federal Circuit’s alleged usage of a 
narrow suggestion test do not end with these two recent reports. 
Contemporary scholarship has concluded that the Federal Circuit 
requires the suggestion to come from a prior art reference. Professor 
Rebecca Eisenberg asserts that the court’s current approach 
“sidelines” the person having ordinary skill in the art in the 
nonobviousness analysis.92 Eisenberg concludes that the court “all 
but ignor[es] the statutory directive that judgments of 
nonobviousness be made from [the perspective of the person having 
ordinary skill in the art].”93 Professor Arti Rai comes to a similar 
 
 88. Id. The focus here will be on the NRC’s discussion of business-method patents and 
nonobviousness. The NRC’s report on nonobviousness and gene sequence-related inventions 
focuses on the Federal Circuit’s requirement that a gene sequence invention is “only obvious 
and unpatentable when the obvious route to try is coupled with a ‘reasonable expectation of 
success.’” Id. at 91–92 (focusing on the Federal Circuit’s decisions in In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781 
(Fed. Cir. 1993) and In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). This part of the report does 
not focus on the court’s use of the suggestion test and therefore is not directly relevant to this 
Article. 
 89. Id. at 88. 
 90. Id. at 88–89. The NRC’s report further notes that even when business method 
information is published, it is mostly likely that “non-obvious information” is published. Id. at 
90. 
 91. Id. at 89–90. The FTC’s report concurs with this analysis. See FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, supra note 9, ch. 4, at 40. 
 92. Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 888. 
 93. Id. 
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conclusion, emphasizing how the court’s application of the narrow 
suggestion test severely limits the USPTO’s review of patent 
applications.94 Rai contends that the USPTO cannot rely upon its 
knowledge of the skill in the art, hampering a significant avenue by 
which it can establish a prima facie case of obviousness.95 
The Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence on the suggestion test is also 
the subject of a pending case before the Supreme Court. In KSR 
International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., the Supreme Court will review the 
Federal Circuit’s nonobviousness case law and, more specifically, its 
usage of the suggestion test.96 All of the amicus briefs filed in 
support of KSR conclude that the current Federal Circuit case law 
implements too lax of a nonobviousness requirement. Most of the 
briefs specifically focus on the Federal Circuit’s implementation of 
the suggestion test and argue that the test, as implemented, ignores 
any knowledge of a person having ordinary skill in the art.97 The 
court requires that the nonobviousness analysis focus solely on the 
prior art and not on undocumented information known at the time 
of the invention.98 The briefs conclude that the current suggestion 
test and low standard for nonobviousness result in bad patent policy 
and harm to innovation.99 Based on the briefing and the certified 
question, the Supreme Court will look at the suggestion test in 
general, and specifically at whether the test ignores undocumented 
evidence of obviousness.100 
These recent critiques of Federal Circuit’s nonobviousness 
jurisprudence are quite numerous and fairly harsh. A significant 
number of them rest on a basic initial assumption—the Federal 
Circuit employs a narrow suggestion test, limiting the grounds for 
 
 94. Arti K. Rai, Allocating Power over Fact-Finding in the Patent System, 19 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 907, 912–17 (2004). 
 95. Id.  
 96. See Cisco Brief, supra note 13; Brief of IP Professors, supra note 13; Brief of the 
Progress & Freedom Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, KSR Int’l Co. v. 
Teleflex, Inc., No. 04-1350 (U.S. Aug. 22, 2006), 2006 WL 2452361. The underlying 
Federal Circuit opinion, Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR International Co., 119 F. App’x 282 (Fed. Cir. 
2005), will be discussed in detail in Part IV.A.1, infra, of this Article. The arguments made in 
these briefs concerning Supreme Court case law and the statutory language of § 103, while 
part of the nonobviousness debate, fall beyond the scope of this Article. 
 97. See, e.g., Brief of IP Professors, supra note 13, at 10–16. 
 98. Id. 
 99. See, e.g., id. at 23–25. 
 100. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2965, 2965 (2006). 
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suggestion to the content of prior art references. This inflexible 
application of the test is employed in both the review of patent 
infringement cases and opinions of the USPTO. This narrow 
suggestion test, the argument continues, creates a relaxed 
nonobviousness standard allowing technically obvious inventions to 
be deemed patentable and successfully enforced. Such a result upsets 
the balance between innovation and competition that the 
nonobviousness doctrine is tasked with maintaining. 
IV. EXAMINATION OF RECENT FEDERAL CIRCUIT OPINIONS USING 
THE SUGGESTION TEST 
The first step in understanding the Federal Circuit’s recent usage 
of the suggestion test is to find the answer to a purely descriptive 
question. What are the exact contours of the suggestion test the 
court is employing? This question tests the validity of the initial 
assumption of recent criticism—that the court uses a narrow 
suggestion test and focuses only on documented suggestions. 
To test this assumption, this Part reports the results of a 
descriptive study that looked at suggestion test jurisprudence over a 
three-year period.101 This study examined all written decisions of the 
Federal Circuit including a determination on the issue of 
nonobviousness.102 For the three-year period, sixty-nine opinions, 
considering ninety-two patents, made a determination on the issue 
of nonobviousness.103 
 
 101. The exact three year period is from August 31, 2002 to September 1, 2005. 
 102. The cases were obtained by searching the Lexis Federal Circuit database over the 
defined three year period for cases that included the terms “(patent and infring!)” to gather 
appeals from patent infringement cases and the term “patent” in the “In re” cases to gather 
appeals from the USPTO. From this database of cases, those cases in which the court affirmed, 
reversed, or vacated a final decision on nonobviousness were considered. 
  Summary affirmances, “Rule 36” cases, were not included in the population because 
the specific basis for affirmance, and thus the court’s usage of the suggestion test, could not be 
discerned. See FED. CIR. R. 36 (“[The] court may enter a judgment of affirmance without 
opinion, citing this rule, when it determines . . . an opinion would have no precedential 
value.”). In addition, only those decisions involving utility patents, as opposed to design or 
plant patents, were included. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 161–164, 171–173 (2000) (identifying patents 
for plants and designs).  
 103. Since this Article is focused on those specific cases that provide insight into the full 
contours of the suggestion test, only those cases will be cited specifically. However, the 
complete results of this study are on file with the author and available upon request. 
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Of this population of sixty-nine opinions, only twelve cases 
provide insight into the full contours of the suggestion test.104 These 
are cases where the court discusses the suggestion test in the context 
of both documented and undocumented suggestions. The other 
opinions include twenty where the court never discussed the 
suggestion test and thirty-seven where the court was confronted with 
only prior art-based suggestion evidence.105 The focus of this Part is, 
therefore, on the twelve cases that provide some insight into the 
descriptive question at hand. 
A. Federal Circuit Opinions Using the Narrow Suggestion Test 
The focus is initially on cases where the narrow suggestion test is 
apparently used.106 This discussion includes Federal Circuit opinions 
reviewing appeals from both patent infringement decisions by district 
courts and decisions by the USPTO Board of Patent Appeals and 
Interferences (the “Board”) affirming final rejections of patent 
applications. 
 
 104. See In re Battiston, 139 F. App’x 281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Princeton Biochems., Inc. v. 
Beckman Coulter, Inc., 411 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Syntex (U.S.A.) LLC v. Apotex, 
Inc., 407 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005); ISCO Int’l, Inc. v. Conductus, Inc., 123 F. App’x 974 
(Fed. Cir. 2005); Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int’l, Co., 119 F. App’x 282 (Fed. Cir. 2005); In re 
Beasley, 117 F. App’x 739 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. Saint Jude Med., 
Inc., 381 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Nylen, 97 F. App’x 293 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Ruiz v. 
A.B. Chance, 357 F.3d 1270 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Huston, 308 F.3d 1267 (Fed. Cir. 
2002); N. Am. Oil Co. v. Star Brite Dist., Inc., 46 F. App’x 629 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Novo 
Nordisk A/S v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 304 F.3d 1216 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 105. This later category of thirty-seven cases did not force the Federal Circuit to choose 
between the broad and narrow suggestion tests because the litigants only relied on prior art to 
establish a motivation to combine. 
  While these opinions do not give information on the contours of the court’s 
suggestion test, they may provide insight into what litigants perceive to be the suggestion test 
the court employs—a narrow suggestion test. By relying on only prior art, the litigants may be 
signaling that they do not believe the court will accept anything else to establish a suggestion 
to combine. For anyone reading the court’s opinions, such a belief is unlikely because, as will 
be demonstrated below, the Federal Circuit on a number of occasions over the three-year 
period found a suggestion to combine based on undocumented suggestion evidence. 
 106. There are four such opinions. See Teleflex, 119 F. App’x 282; Beasley, 117 F. App’x 
739; Cardiac Pacemakers, 381 F.3d 1371; Huston, 308 F.3d 1267. For purposes of brevity, 
and to avoid redundancy, the discussion will detail the court’s analysis in the first three 
opinions. 
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1. Appeals from patent infringement cases 
Any discussion of the narrow suggestion test must start with the 
decision that is currently under review by the Supreme Court, 
Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR International Co.107 Teleflex sued KSR alleging 
infringement of its patent directed to an adjustable pedal assembly 
for use with electronic throttle control in automobiles.108 In due 
course, the district granted KSR summary judgment of invalidity, 
concluding that the patent was obvious.109 
The Federal Circuit, in an unpublished opinion, vacated the 
summary judgment of obviousness.110 The court based its decision, 
in part, on the conclusion that the district court erred as a matter of 
law.111 The error was in the district court’s reliance on the nature of 
the problem being solved to establish the necessary suggestion to 
combine.112 The Federal Circuit recited the three bases for 
establishing a motivation to combine—articulating the broad 
suggestion test.113 The court then, however, indicated that in order 
to support a finding of obviousness, the prior art references must 
“address the precise problem that the patentee was trying to 
solve.”114 Here, the prior art was not directed at solving the same 
problem as Teleflex’s patent—designing a “smaller, less complex, 
and less expensive electronic pedal assembly.”115 Instead, the art 
either addressed different problems—solving the “constant ratio 
problem” or “reducing wire chafing”—or suffered from the problem 
Teleflex’s patent solves.116 
Thus, while recognizing that suggestion can come from outside 
the prior art references, the court still required the suggestion, in this 
 
 107. 119 F. App’x 282. 
 108. Id. at 283–84. The relevant patent is U.S. Patent No. 6,237,565 (filed Aug. 22, 
2000). Specifically, it asserted claim 4 of the patent describing an assembly where the 
electronic control is mounted to the support bracket of the assembly so as to avoid movement 
of the electronic control when the pedal’s position is adjusted. Teleflex, 119 F. App’x at 284.  
 109. Teleflex, 119 F. App’x at 284. 
 110. Id. at 283.  
 111. Id. (“[T]he district court’s analysis applied an incomplete teaching-suggestion-
motivation test.”). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 288–89. 
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case, to have some basis in the references themselves.117 A suggestion 
established from the nature of the problem being solved needed to 
have some grounding in the prior art—the art needed to address the 
problem. Failure to establish such grounding in the art itself was a 
substantive error in the law—an improper implementation of the 
suggestion test.118 The court appears to conflate the nature of the 
problem category for a motivation to combine with the prior art 
category, substantively narrowing the suggestion test. The Teleflex 
case, therefore, can be read as implementing the narrow suggestion 
test. 
The court’s opinion in Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude 
Medical, Inc. provides another arguable example of the narrow 
suggestion test.119 Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. (“CPI”) sued St. Jude 
Medical, Inc. (“St. Jude”) alleging infringement of its patents 
covering implantable cardiac defibrillators.120 The case was tried 
before a jury, which found that St. Jude had infringed one of the 
asserted patents and that the patent was valid.121 The district court 
granted, in part, St. Jude’s motion for judgment as a matter of law 
(“JMOL”), finding the infringed patent’s asserted claims obvious.122 
The Federal Circuit, on appeal, vacated the district court’s 
JMOL and reinstated the jury’s verdict of nonobviousness.123 In 
discussing the evidence presented to the jury, the Federal Circuit’s 
opinion focused on what suggestion or motivation came from the 
prior art. First, the court dismissed the “recognition of the problem” 
as a basis for finding the infringed patent obvious in this case.124 The 
court concluded that the evidence showed that there was recognition 
only of the need for a solution and that “does not render obvious 
the achievement that meets that need.”125 Then, to frame its inquiry, 
the court focused on “[w]hether the prior art provides the 
 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. 381 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 120. Id. at 1373–74. The patents specifically claimed defibrillators capable of performing 
multi-mode therapy—therapy that administers different defibrillation in response to different 
cardiac events. Id. at 1374. 
 121. Id. at 1374–75. 
 122. Id. at 1375. While not the focus of this Article’s discussion, the district court also 
found the asserted claims invalid because of a failure to disclose the best mode. Id. 
 123. Id. at 1378. 
 124. Id. at 1377. 
 125. Id. 
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suggestion or motivation or teaching to select from prior knowledge 
and combine it in a way that would produce the invention at issue is 
a question of fact.”126 The Federal Circuit found factual support for 
the conclusion of no suggestion or motivation in the testimony of 
one of CPI’s experts.127 The court noted that the expert “stress[ed] 
that no reference teaches combining” the individual pieces of prior 
art “in a single device, or states that it is feasible to do so.”128 
This focus on the prior art and suggestion or motivation coming 
from the prior art implies that the court was using the same narrow 
suggestion test that would later be used in Teleflex. In Cardiac 
Pacemaker, the Federal Circuit appears to dismiss the nature of the 
problem as being a basis for a suggestion to combine. Then, the 
court finds substantial evidence to support the jury’s finding of 
nonobviousness in the fact that the prior art provided no suggestion. 
The court’s opinion appears to reject the full contours of the broad 
suggestion test and, like Teleflex, endorse the narrow suggestion test. 
2. Appeals from the USPTO 
Support for the existence of a narrow suggestion test can also be 
found in recent Federal Circuit cases that review appeals from 
USPTO decisions. The court’s unpublished opinion in In re Beasley 
provides a good example of the narrow suggestion in the USPTO 
context.129 In Beasley, the court reviewed the rejection of a patent 
application’s claims “directed to the generation of images or 
markings on a video display screen using a light pen,” which 
included “mapping the display screen into memory on a point-by-
point basis.”130 
The examiner found the application invalid because of 
obviousness in light of three prior art references.131 One reference 
 
 126. Id. at 1378 (citing Winner Int’l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 2002 F.3d 1340, 1348 
(Fed. Cir. 2000)) (emphasis added). 
 127. Id. at 1377. 
 128. Id. 
 129. 117 F. App’x 739, 743–45 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 130. Id. at 740. Beasley’s application was U.S. Patent Application 07/636,839, filed Jan. 
2, 1991. Id. The patent’s independent claims specifically required “mapping the display screen 
into the memory on a point-by-point basis . . . to provide a one-to-one correspondence” 
between the points on the screen and the memory locations. Id. 
 131. Id. at 740–41. The three references were U.S. Patent No. 3,832,485 (“Pieters”) 
combined with either U.S. Patent No. 3,973,245 (“Belser”) or U.S. Patent No. 4,847,604 
(“Doyle”). Id. 
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disclosed the creation of demarcations on images using a light pen.132 
It failed, however, to disclose the point-by-point mapping limitation 
claimed by the application at issue.133 The examiner concluded, 
however, that one of two other references disclosed “a conventional 
bit map memory mapping a display screen into the memory on a 
point by point basis.”134 The examiner also concluded that “it would 
have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to substitute” 
the prior art “bit map memory” for the memory used in the light 
pen prior art.135 A person of ordinary skill in the art would be 
motivated to make such a change, the examiner concluded, “because 
image data stored in the bit map format can be read out rapidly.”136 
It was also noted that it was “well known in [the] computer display 
art to substitute a bit map memory for a conventional memory such 
as the memory used” in the light pen prior art.137 Beasley appealed to 
the Board, and the Board maintained the examiner’s obviousness 
rejection.138 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit concluded that there was no 
substantial evidence to support a prima facie case of obviousness. 
The court first noted that “the advantages of one type of memory 
over another that had been advanced by the examiner and the Board 
for the express purpose of showing motivation for the proposed 
substitution have been set forth without any supporting citations to 
relevant portions of either [the prior art], or any other authority.”139 
The court faulted the Board for relying on “the examiner’s and its 
own knowledge as skilled artisans.”140 The court also focused on the 
lack of “a citation of any relevant, identifiable source of information 
justifying” the substitution of the light pen prior art’s memory with 
the memory disclosed in the other two pieces of prior art.141 
 
 132. Id. (citing the Pieters reference). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 740–41. As the court noted, Belser “concerns a method and apparatus for 
‘converting information in coded form into a dot matrix or raster form,’” while Doyle “is 
directed to a system that allows a user to point to a feature on an image and cause descriptive 
information . . . to appear.” Id. at 741 n.3 (citing the relevant patents). 
 135. Id. at 741. 
 136. Id. (quoting the examiner’s office action). 
 137. Id. at 741 (quoting the examiner’s office action). 
 138. Id. at 741–42. 
 139. Id. at 743. 
 140. Id. at 743–44. 
 141. Id. at 744. 
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The analysis in Beasley appears to be very similar to that of 
Teleflex and Cardiac Pacemaker. The Federal Circuit does not 
explicitly reject the notion that a suggestion can come from general 
knowledge in the art or the nature of the problem being solved. But, 
the court does reject these grounds de facto by appearing to require a 
suggestion to be tied in some way to the prior art—again, conflating 
the three separate prongs of the suggestion test into one, focused 
solely on prior art. Beasley, when viewed with Teleflex and Cardiac 
Pacemaker, appears to establish a significant, substantive change in 
the law, moving away from the traditional, broad suggestion test to a 
narrow test. 
B. Federal Circuit Opinions Using the Broad Suggestion Test 
After looking at such recent decisions as Teleflex, Cardiac 
Pacemaker, and Beasley, it is not hard to see why commentators have 
come to the conclusion that the Federal Circuit applies a narrow 
suggestion test. However, the full results of my descriptive study 
indicate that the court is not always so focused on prior art when 
looking for a viable suggestion or motivation. Opinions during the 
study’s three-year period allow a suggestion to be based solely on 
undocumented grounds coming from either general knowledge of 
those skilled in the art or the nature of the problem being solved.142 
Full usage of the traditionally recited suggestion test—the broad 
suggestion test—can be found in Federal Circuit jurisprudence. 
This section discusses some of the cases that establish the broad 
suggestion test’s continued existence in detail below. As with the 
previous discussion, this section examines appeals both from patent 
infringement decisions and final rejections of patent applications by 
the USPTO. 
 
 142. There are eight cases where the court uses the broad suggestion test. See, e.g., In re 
Battiston, 139 F. App’x 281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Syntex (U.S.A.) LLC v. Apotex, Inc., 407 F.3d 
1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Princeton Biochemical, Inc. v. Beckman Coulter, Inc., 411 F.3d 1332 
(Fed. Cir. 2005); ISCO Int’l, Inc. v. Conductus, Inc., 123 F. App’x 974 (Fed. Cir. 2005); In 
re Nylen, 97 F. App’x 293 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Ruiz v. A.B. Chance, 357 F.3d 1270 (Fed. Cir. 
2004); Novo Nordisk A/S v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 304 F.3d 1216 (Fed. Cir. 2002); N. 
Am. Oil Co. v. Star Brite Dist., Inc., 46 F. App’x 629 (Fed. Cir. 2002). As with the narrow 
suggestion test cases, only a subset (five) of these cases will be discussed in detail. 
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1. Appeals from patent infringement cases 
The court’s analysis in Princeton Biochemical, Inc. v. Beckman 
Coulter, Inc. provides the first example of the court using the broad 
suggestion test.143 Princeton Biochemical sued Beckman Coulter 
alleging infringement of Princeton’s patent on a capillary 
electrophoresis device.144 The jury found the patent infringed and 
valid.145 The district court found the jury’s verdict unsupported by 
substantial evidence and, accordingly, granted JMOL that the patent 
claims were invalid for reasons of obviousness.146 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant 
of JMOL.147 On the issue of obviousness, the court noted that all of 
the elements of the claim were disclosed in the prior art, but that this 
“does not render a claim obvious.”148 The court looked at the 
evidence regarding a suggestion or motivation to combine, but it did 
not focus solely on the prior art. Instead, the court agreed with the 
district court’s finding of a suggestion to combine in the “knowledge 
of those skilled in the art at the time.”149 The court specifically 
approved of the testimony from one of Princeton’s expert witnesses, 
Dr. Jorgenson. Dr. Jorgenson testified that combining the claimed 
elements of coiling and supporting the coils of prior art capillaries 
“was within the knowledge of one of skill in the art.”150 Notably, the 
court did not require such knowledge be documented in a prior art 
reference. 
The court also approved of the district court’s finding of a 
suggestion in “the nature of the problem.”151 The problem the 
invention addressed was the lengthening and securing of the prior 
art capillaries.152 Dr. Jorgenson testified that the nature of the 
 
 143. 411 F.3d 1332. 
 144. Id. at 1334. The capillaries referenced are tubes usually made of quartz. Id. 
“Electrophoresis is one method available for the investigation of biological materials, and is an 
efficient procedure for the separation and detection of proteins and other matter.” Id. 
 145. Id. at 1333–34. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 1334. 
 148. Id. at 1338. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 1338–39. 
 152. Id. 
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problem “called for the [claimed] combination.”153 He stated that a 
person with ordinary skill in the art, in order to both lengthen and 
secure the capillary, “would know to coil a capillary” and secure it to 
a support because “you don’t want a coil floating around without 
some kind of support.”154 While the Federal Circuit discussed some 
prior art references, the court clearly credited Dr. Jorgenson’s 
testimony as supporting, by itself, a finding of suggestion based on 
the nature of the problem being solved. Teachings from the prior art 
were not required to find such a suggestion.155 
Further evidence that the broad suggestion test is still employed 
by the Federal Circuit can be found in its opinion in Syntex (U.S.A.) 
LLC v. Apotex, Inc.156 In Syntex, the Federal Circuit was reviewing 
the results of a bench trial that concluded, in part, that the asserted 
patent claims on sterile, preserved eye drops were valid and had been 
infringed.157 The court vacated and remanded the finding of validity 
because the district court failed to correctly consider evidence 
regarding the issue of nonobviousness.158 
Of particular relevance to the lower court’s reapplication of the 
suggestion test on remand, the Federal Circuit asked the district 
court to reconsider the testimony of one of Apotex’s experts.159 The 
court noted that the expert presented a “theory of why a person of 
skill in the art would have not found it unusual” to modify the prior 
art to make the claimed eye drops.160 Apotex’s expert based this 
conclusion on “a scientific rationale” and the knowledge of those 
skilled in the art.161 
The Federal Circuit also uses the broad suggestion test in Ruiz v. 
A.B. Chance Co.162 Ruiz filed a declaratory judgment claim that it 
had not infringed A.B. Chance Co.’s patents on a screw anchor 
 
 153. Id. at 1339. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. 407 F.3d 1371, 1379–83 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 157. Id. at 1373. 
 158. Id. at 1379–83, 1385. 
 159. Id. at 1380–82. 
 160. Id. at 1381. 
 161. Id. at 1381–82. Apotex’s expert also based this conclusion on teachings from the 
references. Id. However, the court specifically noted the independent, non-art bases for the 
expert’s conclusion of suggestion. Id. 
 162. 357 F.3d 1270, 1275–77 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
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system for underpinning foundations.163 As the result of a bench 
trial, the district court found that although the patents were 
infringed, the claims were invalid as obvious.164 
In the case’s second appeal to the Federal Circuit, the court 
addressed the district court’s finding of obviousness.165 Specifically, 
the court examined the district court’s finding of a motivation to 
combine on the nature of the problem of underpinning 
foundations.166 The court noted that the “record . . . does not 
feature an express written teaching in the art to make [the] 
combination” of the two pieces of prior art to render the asserted 
claims obvious.167 However, it is not the law “that an express, written 
motivation to combine must appear in prior art references before a 
finding of obviousness. Stated differently, this court has consistently 
stated that a court or examiner may find a motivation to combine 
prior art references in the nature of the problem to be solved.”168 
The Federal Circuit then approved the district court’s reliance on 
evidence that “a person seeking to solve [the] exact same problem” 
solved by the claimed invention “would consult the references and 
apply their teachings together.”169 
The court’s opinion in Ruiz is particularly insightful because it 
addresses head on the criticism surrounding the suggestion test. The 
court clearly states that a suggestion or motivation may come from 
outside the prior art itself.170 And then the court applies this stated 
doctrine, basing its affirmance on something other than prior art.171 
Ruiz, combined with Princeton Biochemical and Syntex, establishes 
that the Federal Circuit, at least in some instances, employs a broad 
suggestion test.172 
 
 163. Id. at 1273. 
 164. Id. at 1274. 
 165. Id. at 1275–77. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 1276–77. 
 168. Id. at 1276 (citing Display Techs., Inc. v. Paul Flum Ideas, Inc., 60 F. App’x 787 
(Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Haung, 100 F.3d 135, 139 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Pro-Mold & Tool 
Co. v. Great Lakes Plastics, Inc., 75 F.3d 1568, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). 
 169. Ruiz, 357 F.3d at 1277. 
 170. Id. at 1276. 
 171. Id. at 1277. 
 172. Id. at 1276; Syntex (U.S.A.) LLC v. Apotex, Inc., 407 F.3d 1371, 1379–83 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005). 
COTROPIA.MRO.DOC 1/20/2007 1:08:43 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2006 
1546 
2. Appeals from the USPTO 
There are also cases involving appeals from the USPTO that 
apply a broad suggestion test. For example, the Federal Circuit’s 
decision in In re Battiston utilizes the traditional, broad suggestion 
test.173 Battiston involved an appeal from a sustained final rejection 
finding specific claims directed toward a “splash resistant pan for use 
with a commode to aid elderly or infirmed persons who cannot use a 
conventional porcelain toilet” invalid.174 The claims at issue required, 
in part, a “pan having an upper generally rectangular rim.”175 
The examiner rejected the application’s claims based on prior art 
cited in the background of the application in combination with the 
two other patents.176 Two of the pieces of prior art each disclosed all 
of the elements of the application’s claims except the required 
“rectangular rim.”177 Another disclosed “a pan comprising an upper 
rim and four planar sides.”178 Based on this art, the examiner and 
Board found the claims obvious.179 
The Federal Circuit affirmed the finding of obviousness.180 In 
response to Battiston’s argument that the USPTO used hindsight in 
rejecting his claims, the Federal Circuit found that substantial 
evidence supported the USPTO’s finding of a suggestion to combine 
the references.181 The court found such a suggestion for “a 
commode configured with a rectangular opening, flow[ing] from the 
ordinary knowledge of one skilled in the art.”182 
While the opinion is not long on analysis, the court clearly 
applies a broad suggestion test. The court explicitly bases its 
conclusion of obviousness on an undocumented suggestion—general 
knowledge in the art.183 The court fails, however, to articulate the 
Board’s specific analysis as to how such knowledge leads to 
combining the teachings of a rectangular rim with the other prior 
 
 173. 139 F. App’x 281 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 174. Id. at 282. 
 175. Id. at 283. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 285. 
 181. Id. at 283–84. 
 182. Id. at 284 (citing In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
 183. Id. 
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art. But the court still finds the Board’s analysis and reliance on 
knowledge in the art sufficient by itself.184 A specific reference was 
not required to support a finding of obviousness.185 
The Federal Circuit also applied a broad suggestion test in In re 
Nylen.186 In Nylen, the court reviewed the Board’s affirmance of 
obviousness rejections of a patent application claiming a device that 
applies both a herbicide and a dye to weeds.187 The application’s 
claims were found obvious in light of prior art references directed to 
herbicide applicators and the combining of dye with agricultural 
chemicals.188 The Federal Circuit affirmed this rejection.189 The court 
noted that “the references do not themselves indicate that they 
should be combined.”190 The court concluded, however, that “the 
nature of the problem to be solved . . . would undoubtedly lead a 
person of ordinary skill in the art to consult prior art” and make the 
claimed device.191 The court’s analysis in Nylen and Battiston 
indicates that, as with appeals from patent infringement cases, the 
Federal Circuit is using the broad suggestion test, at least in some 
instances.  
V. RESOLVING THE APPARENT INCONSISTENCY—VIEWING THE 
SUGGESTION TEST AS A “RULE OF EVIDENCE” 
At first blush, some panels of the Federal Circuit employ a 
narrow suggestion test while others employ a broad test, creating an 
apparent inconsistency in the court’s nonobviousness precedents. 
This results in some panels focusing on only prior art as a basis for a 
finding of suggestion, while others allow information other than 
prior art to establish a suggestion to combine.192 The existence of 
such an inconsistency is not surprising because this is not the first 
 
 184. Id. at 284. 
 185. Id. As will be discussed in more detail in Part V, infra, the holding in Battiston 
appears to contradict the strict requirement for a citable prior art reference discussed in Beasley. 
 186. 97 F. App’x 293, 294 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 187. Id. at 293–94. The device helps the user to direct the herbicide to weeds and thus 
avoid damaging nearby plants by creating visual confirmation of the area sprayed. Id. at 294. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Compare Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 381 F.3d 1371, 1375–78 
(Fed. Cir. 2004), with Princeton Biochemical, Inc. v. Beckman Coulter, Inc., 411 F.3d 1332, 
1338–39 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
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time the Federal Circuit has developed two opposing articulations of 
a particular patent law doctrine.193 In fact, such a scenario justifies 
the Supreme Court’s taking the Teleflex case in order to, at the very 
least, resolve the conflict in Federal Circuit case law and clarify the 
contours of the suggestion test.194 
However, the focus of the discussion so far has been on 
determining the exact contours of the substantive standard 
governing the suggestion test and the nonobviousness requirement 
in general. That is, what standard or rule governs the legal 
determination of nonobviousness? This analysis overlooks the 
possibility that the suggestion test is not operating solely on the 
substantive law plane. The suggestion test may also perform a 
procedural-like function in patent law. More specifically, the Federal 
Circuit may be focusing on the type of evidence being presented to 
prove a suggestion to combine. This Part investigates whether the 
suggestion test contains an evidentiary-like aspect.195 
To discern whether an evidentiary-like component to the 
suggestion test exists, both the narrow and broad suggestion test 
cases are revisited.196 This Part first examines the narrow suggestion 
 
 193. A perfect example of this is the claim construction context, where the court was 
employing at least two different claim interpretation methodologies. See Christopher A. 
Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Methodologies and Their Claim Scope Paradigms, 47 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 83–90 (2005) (detailing the specification methodology and the 
heavy presumption methodology). The court has since chosen a single methodology. See 
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1320–22 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (adopting the 
specification methodology), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1332 (2006).  
 194. Petitioners for certiorari asked for much more, however. See, e.g., Cisco Brief, supra 
note 13, at 14–16 (asking the Court to transfer the nonobviousness determination back to the 
province of the courts). 
 195. Taking an evidentiary look at substantive area of intellectual property law is not 
novel. See, e.g., Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of Evidence, 52 DUKE L.J. 683 (2003) 
(arguing that some copyright doctrines are formulated to exclude cases whose evidentiary 
complexities make them, on balance, socially costly). In fact, Robert Merges has discussed 
matters of evidence regarding the Federal Circuit’s case law surrounding secondary factors of 
nonobviousness. Merges, supra note 8, at 833–34 (discussing whether the lack of nexus 
between a secondary factor and the invention either “undercuts the relevance of the secondary 
consideration, and hence its admissibility, or whether it merely detracts from the weight of that 
consideration”). Neither of these articles, however, evaluates the evidentiary aspects of the 
substantive law under the evidence theory of truth maximization. See infra Part VI (performing 
such an evaluation). 
 196. One can argue that, in order to truly discern the full scope of this evidentiary-like 
rule, the underlying district court cases or Board appeals should also be examined to see exactly 
what type of evidence was presented. The Federal Circuit could simply be characterizing the 
evidence in its opinions to better serve the result it wants to obtain. Unobserved reasoning that 
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test cases, focusing on what evidence of undocumented suggestion 
the parties presented that the Federal Circuit either ignored or 
rejected. This evidence is then compared to the undocumented 
suggestion evidence the court accepted in the broad suggestion test 
cases. From this comparison, a basic “rule of evidence” emerges.197 
 
the data set being used would simply not pick up could exist, such as a rationale or bias not 
expressly set forth in the written opinions examined. See R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, 
Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1105, 1128 (2004) (recognizing the possibility of unobserved reasoning in a study 
concerning the Federal Circuit’s claim interpretation jurisprudence). In addition, the data set 
cannot take into account behavior on the litigants’ part. The types of evidence and 
argumentation presented to the court are the product of the litigants. See, e.g., George L. 
Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 
(1984) (noting that analysis based on appellate cases is incomplete because only a “peculiar 
sample of cases” actually are tried and appealed). For example, as previously noted, many of 
the suggestion test cases during the three year period studied include only prior art presented 
by the litigants as evidence of suggestion. See supra note 105. The opinions thus cannot be 
viewed as “independent expressions of methodology or reasoning.” Wagner & Petherbridge, 
supra, at 1129. 
  The Federal Circuit opinions, however, are the best data set from which to discern 
an evidentiary rule, if there is one. Certainly these concerns limit the results of this descriptive 
inquiry. But the text of the opinions—the observed results—are what critics of the Federal 
Circuit’s jurisprudence are focusing on. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 9, ch. 4, at 
12–14; Brief of IP Professors, supra note 13, at 5–9. In addition, due to the nature of the 
common law, the opinion text is what establishes the rules and standards governing future 
nonobviousness decisions. See Pintip Hompluem Dunn, Note, How Judges Overrule Speech Act 
Theory and the Doctrine of Stare Decisis, 113 YALE L.J. 493, 498 (2003) (“[I]n the common 
law . . . the only texts that judges can reference are the texts of earlier judicial opinions.”). 
Those unobserved results stay unobserved. Furthermore, if the Federal Circuit has a particular 
view on how the suggestion test should be tailored and wants that view to have some effect on 
patent observers, one can validly assume that it would make that view known through its 
opinions and its handling of evidence presented in those cases. Finally, the behavior of 
litigants, while necessarily affecting the data, may simply reinforce the court’s rule in this area. 
Presumably, litigants present evidence and arguments they believe will allow their clients to 
prevail. In order to prevail, the evidence and argument must fit within the rules and standards 
expressed in the court’s earlier opinions. Thus, litigant behavior can be viewed as a feedback 
mechanism that simply further evidences what the courts are doing. 
 197. The phrase, “rule of evidence,” will be used in this Article as shorthand for the 
evidentiary-like aspect of the suggestion test being discussed. The use of the label “rule of 
evidence” is not meant to indicate that rule being discussed is a rule of evidence in the 
traditional sense. It is not part of, or born from, the Federal Rules of Evidence. Nor is its 
application part of a specific evidentiary proceeding such as a motion in limine or reviewed by 
the Federal Circuit for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 103(c) (noting that 
rulings on the admissibility of evidence should be made outside the presence of the jury); Gen. 
Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997) (holding that the standard for review of admission of 
scientific evidence is abuse of discretion). The rule, while arguably analogous to Federal Rule 
of Evidence 702, is not similar to any established rule of evidence. See infra Part VI.A.3 
(noting that the suggestion test’s rule of evidence helps to increase reliability in a way similar to 
Rule 702). As will become apparent infra, the rule arguably operates more like a burden of 
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The court is not veering from the basic substance of the broad 
suggestion. It is simply encountering cases in which none of the 
undocumented suggestion evidence is detailed and thorough enough 
to be considered in the suggestion test analysis. Testimony or 
administrative correspondence is only admissible if it includes 
detailed analysis as to how a suggestion arises from the nature of the 
problem or general knowledge in the art.198 Once this “rule of 
evidence” is initially defined, another pass is made to see if this rule is 
refined in any way by the Federal Circuit. 
A. Evidence of an Undocumented Suggestion Must Include Detailed 
and Thorough Analysis 
Teleflex Inc. v. KSR International Co., an apparent narrow 
suggestion test case, will act as a starting point in the search for a 
“rule of evidence.”199 In Teleflex, the only undocumented evidence 
on the issue of suggestion presented by KSR was a declaration from 
one of the vice presidents of the accused infringer.200 The declaration 
failed to speak to “whether one of ordinary skill in the art would 
have been motivated” to combine the prior art.201 Instead, the 
declaration only indicated that the prior art “could have been” 
modified to practice the invention.202 The declaration failed to 
provide a “specific motivation to combine” to support a finding of 
obviousness.203 Without the declaration, the accused infringer could 
rely only on the prior art, and, as the court concluded, the prior art 
was not directed toward the nature of the problem being solved.204 
 
proof, raising the standard for evidence of undocumented suggestion, rather than a rule of 
evidence. The rule does, however, have many evidentiary links as well. And thinking of the rule 
in an evidentiary fashion prompts, in some ways, evaluating the rule under evidence theory, 
which has benefits in its own right. See infra Part VII. 
  Thus, “rule of evidence” is simply a label meant to conjure up general notions of 
evidence theory and nothing more. Answering whether the rule embodies all aspects of a true 
rule of evidence is not necessary for any of the analysis to follow. 
 198. The administrative correspondence mentioned here is communications to and from 
the USPTO during patent prosecution. 
 199. 119 F. App’x 282 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2965 (2006). 
 200. Id. at 289. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. The declaration did speak of a particular motivation, but the identified 
motivation would not have combined the prior art in such as way as to practice the invention. 
Id. 
 204. Id. at 288–89. 
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A similar situation presented itself in Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. 
St. Jude Medical, Inc.205 The accused infringer presented nothing 
more than argument to attempt to prove a suggestion to combine. 
As in Teleflex, the accuser relied on the nature of the problem being 
solved to establish a suggestion.206 As the court noted, the prior art 
established, at best, a recognition of the general problem the 
invention addressed.207 No evidence pointed to a “motivation to 
create [the patented] cure.”208 The accuser presented no testimony 
to support a finding that the nature of the problem being solved 
provided a suggestion to combine.209 
These two cases were initially characterized as using a suggestion 
test substantively different from the broad suggestion test.210 The 
narrow suggestion test requires that, regardless of the evidence 
presented by the litigants, the court is to accept only prior art to 
establish a suggestion to combine. In neither case, however, does the 
court explicitly disavow an undocumented basis for finding a 
suggestion. In fact, the court in Teleflex specifically recites the broad 
suggestion test before beginning its analysis.211 
Viewing these cases as making evidentiary-like decisions can 
better explain the court’s actions.212 Undocumented avenues to 
establishing a suggestion to combine were substantively available to 
the litigants—the broad suggestion test was still in play. In these two 
cases the litigants merely failed to present anything on suggestion, 
other than art, that rose to the requisite level of admissibility. Either 
testimony on the issue was not presented, as in Cardiac Pacemaker, 
or the testimony did not contain a detailed analysis as to the 
 
 205. 381 F.3d 1371, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 206. Id. at 1377–78. 
 207. Id. at 1377. There was only a “[r]ecognition of the problem of treating complex 
heart arrhythmias.” Id. This established only that there was a need for some type of solution. 
Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. See id. at 1377–78. 
 210. See supra Part IV.A.1. 
 211. Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int’l Co., 119 F. App’x 282, 285 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. 
granted, 126 S. Ct. 2965 (2006). In fact, to support its recitation of the broad suggestion test, 
the court cites Ruiz, which clearly applies the broad suggestion test. Id. (citing Ruiz v. A.B. 
Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654, 665 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). 
 212. Again, this may not be an actual rule of evidence, but its impact is similar, and 
considering it as an evidentiary creature facilitates the focus on the actual contents of the 
suggestion evidence. See supra notes 196–97. 
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undocumented suggestion, as in Teleflex. The court had prior art as 
the only “admissible” evidence on suggestion to consider. 
The existence of an evidentiary-like rule and the specific contours 
of the rule become even more apparent when taking a second look at 
some of the broad suggestion test cases previously discussed.213 
These cases give examples of what types of undocumented 
suggestion evidence courts can consider in the suggestion test 
analysis. 
In Princeton, the court affirmed a district court’s finding of 
obviousness that was based on suggestions coming from two 
undocumented sources: general knowledge in the art and the nature 
of the problem being solved.214 This shows the court’s willingness to 
apply the broad suggestion test substantively. Even more interesting, 
however, is that the court concentrated on the testimony of a fact 
witness, Dr. Jorgenson, in finding an undocumented suggestion.215 
In its discussion of a suggestion from “the knowledge of those 
skilled in the art at the time of [the] invention,” the court pointed 
out that “Dr. Jorgenson supplied detailed analysis of the prior art 
and the reasons that one of ordinary skill would possess knowledge 
and motivation to combine these simple elements.”216 The court also 
focused on the “detailed” testimony of Dr. Jorgenson when 
concluding that “the nature of the problem supplies a motivation to 
combine th[e] prior art references.”217 Dr. Jorgenson identified what 
specific solutions the nature of the problem being solved called for 
and indicated how “one of ordinary skill in the art at the time” 
would have, accordingly, combined the prior art to make the 
patented invention.218 Dr. Jorgenson’s testimony, specifically the 
thoroughness of his testimony, allowed the court to base its finding 
of obviousness on an undocumented suggestion.219 
 
 213. See supra Part IV.B. 
 214. Princeton Biochemicals, Inc. v. Beckman Coulter, Inc., 411 F.3d 1332, 1338–40 
(Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 215. Id. at 1337–39. 
 216. Id. at 1338 (emphasis added). 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. at 1339. Dr. Jorgenson “observed that the problem called for coiled electro-
phoresis tubes, including capillary tubes, secured in place in a variety of ways,” and that it 
would have been obvious to “coil a capillary to save space” and to secure the “capillary tube to 
a support member.” Id. 
 219. Id. 
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The court engaged in a similar analysis in Syntex when it asked 
the district court on remand to consider a suggestion to combine 
based on something other than a prior art reference.220 In Syntex, the 
court found a fact issue as to whether an anti-inflammatory eye drop 
invention was nonobvious, based in part on a suggestion coming 
from general knowledge in the art.221 Evidence of an undocumented 
suggestion came from testimony of an expert—Dr. Mitra.222 Dr. 
Mitra testified to “his theory of why a person of skill in the art would 
not have found it unusual” to combine the prior art in such a way as 
to practice the invention.223 While relying in part of the teachings of 
the prior art, “[Dr. Mitra] also set forth a scientific rationale for” 
why one of ordinary skill at the time of the invention would have 
made the same selections the patentee had made.224 Dr. Mitra also 
pointed out that knowledge of certain chemical properties of “the 
claimed subject matter would cause a person, ‘as a matter of science’ 
to ‘go into,’” and thus combine, aspects of the prior art.225 
Again, as in Princeton, the court allowed full use of the broad 
suggestion test. And, as in Princeton, accompanying the use of the 
broad suggestion test was undocumented suggestion evidence in the 
form of specific and detailed testimony. The court emphasized the 
details of Dr. Mitra’s testimony in Syntex by focusing on the 
completeness of his testimony. Significant was not just the fact that 
an expert testified to the ultimate conclusion of obviousness or even 
that an undocumented suggestion to combine existed. The 
testimony in Syntex, and in Princeton, went one step further. It 
explained why and how general knowledge in the art or the nature of 
the problem being solved provided a suggestion to combine the art 
in a specific way in order to render the invention obvious. 
The evidence in Princeton and Syntex contains what the evidence 
in Teleflex and Cardiac Pacemaker lacked—detailed and thorough 
testimony. When comparing the analysis in these cases, it becomes 
apparent that the Federal Circuit is looking for a suggestion to 
combine from any of the three categories of the broad suggestion 
 
 220. Syntex (U.S.A.) LLC v. Apotex, Inc., 407 F.3d 1371, 1380–82 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 221. See id. at 1378–79. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. at 1381. 
 224. Id. The court recites Dr. Mitra’s complete reasoning as to why there is a scientific 
rationale for a suggestion to combine in a footnote to the opinion. Id. at 1381 n.11. 
 225. Id. at 1381–82. 
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test. Once the reasoning in Teleflex and Cardiac Pacemaker is 
examined more closely, one can see that the court was not 
exclusively focused on prior art. The substantive law of suggestion 
did not change to limit the inquiry to documented suggestions.226 
Instead, the court is exercising an evidentiary-like aspect of the 
suggestion test by examining the contents of the undocumented 
suggestion evidence. Substantively, a suggestion to combine can be 
proven by undocumented means. However, an additional 
requirement for undocumented suggestions is at work. The court is 
looking for the detail and specificity it found in Princeton and Syntex 
to allow such evidence to be considered. 
The same evidentiary requirement found in the patent 
infringement cases is more directly articulated in the USPTO cases. 
For example, the court’s analysis in Beasley specifically talks of the 
evidentiary requirements of establishing a suggestion through 
undocumented avenues.227 The court rejected the USPTO’s 
conclusion that those with skill in the art would have known the 
advantages of conventional computer memory over bit map memory, 
and thus would have readily substituted one for the other.228 This 
conclusion was rejected because the suggestion “appear[ed] 
unaccompanied by any indication of its origins.”229 “Neither the 
Board nor the examiner ha[d] identified in the record any source of 
information—either from the references cited or otherwise” to 
support this fact.230 
In other words, the court in Beasley looked for the same detailed 
analysis it found in Princeton and Syntex. Simple conclusory 
statements by patent examiners or the Board, both of whom are 
required to have technical expertise,231 were not enough. Any 
evidence of an undocumented suggestion must consist of more than 
a mere conclusion. For such information to be considered—to be 
admissible—it must demonstrate a requisite level of rigor and detail. 
 
 226. See Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int’l Co., 119 F. App’x 282, 285 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. 
granted, 126 S. Ct. 2965 (2006). 
 227. In re Beasley, 117 F. App’x 739, 743–44 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 228. Id. at 743. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. 
 231. See id. at 745 (Dyk, J., dissenting); see also In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1345 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002) (“The patent examiner and the Board are deemed to have experience in the field of 
the invention.”).  
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The decision in Beasley can be viewed as an evidentiary decision. 
The USPTO provided statements relevant to a finding of an 
undocumented suggestion. The problem is that the statements the 
USPTO relied on did not rise to the level of admissibility. While this 
has the de facto impact of limiting the grounds for suggestion to the 
prior art itself, this is a secondary effect of the “rule of evidence,” not 
a change in substantive law. The broad suggestion test still applies, 
but, as in Teleflex and Cardiac Pacemaker, no “admissible” evidence 
is presented to support an undocumented suggestion. 
Admittedly, the origins of this discussion in Beasley are grounded 
in administrative law. The court in Beasley cites its earlier decision in 
In re Lee for the proposition that the USPTO must ground its 
decisions in “objective evidence of record.”232 In Lee, the court came 
to this conclusion because the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 
institutes a “reasoned decisionmaking” scheme, and in order to 
ensure a “sound decision” has been reached, the administrative 
agency must “articulate[] the reasons for that decision.”233 Thus, to 
ensure proper review of the USPTO’s decision of obviousness, the 
USPTO “must not only assure that the requisite findings are made, 
based on evidence of record, but must also explain the reasoning by 
which the findings are deemed to support the agency’s 
conclusion.”234 
However, the rule of law established in Lee and used in Beasley is 
still procedural in nature, not substantive. Thus, the reasoning in Lee 
is already much closer to evoking evidence law—another procedural 
area of law—than substantive law. In addition, the need for effective 
judicial review of an agency’s actions entails, at least in part, a 
determination of whether the agency’s decision is supported by 
evidence that reaches a specific level—substantial evidence.235 Finally, 
the Lee decision clearly sets forth evidentiary standards. Any factual 
determination by the USPTO must be “based on objective evidence 
of record.”236 Common knowledge and common sense are not 
 
 232. Beasley, 117 F. App’x at 745 (Dyk, J., dissenting) (citing Lee, 277 F.3d at 1343). 
 233. Lee, 277 F.3d at 1342 (quoting Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Nat’l Labor 
Relations Bd., 522 U.S. 359, 374 (1998)). 
 234. Id. at 1344. 
 235. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2005) (setting forth the standards of review). The APA 
specifically requires an agency’s factual findings be supported by substantial evidence. Id. § 
706(2)(E). 
 236. Lee, 277 F.3d at 1343. 
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substitutes for such evidence.237 These statements are directed at the 
types of evidence an agency can rely on and, thus, establish an 
evidentiary-like standard. The discussion in Beasley, while grounded 
in administrative law, further supports a finding that the suggestion 
test is behaving in an evidentiary-like manner. 
B. Amount of Detail Required Is Related to the Technological 
Complexity of the Invention 
The evidentiary-like aspect of the suggestion test just discussed—
that evidence of an undocumented suggestion must be based on 
testimony including detailed analysis—explains most of the apparent 
inconsistency between the broad and narrow suggestion test cases. 
This rule, however, does not explain the results in all of the cases. 
There are still a few cases discussed in Part III of this Article—Ruiz, 
Battiston, and Nylen—wherein the court finds an undocumented 
suggestion even though the existence of detailed testimony analyzing 
this suggestion is lacking. In such situations, under the rule of 
evidence just articulated, a suggestion test cannot be established. No 
admissible evidence under the suggestion test is presented, and 
therefore, no evidence can substantiate a factual finding of a 
suggestion to combine. In other words, a similar situation as in 
Teleflex, Cardiac Pacemaker, and Beasley is presented. But such a 
result is not reached by the Federal Circuit—the court still allows a 
suggestion to be found on undocumented grounds. 
The one characteristic all of these cases have in common is that 
the patented technology is fairly simplistic. For example, in Ruiz, the 
patent at issue claimed a screw anchor system for underpinning a 
building’s foundation. The invention was comprised of a screw 
anchor and a connecting metal bracket.238 A prior art reference 
disclosed the claimed screw anchor component while another piece 
of art disclosed the claimed metal bracket.239 The suggestion 
question centered on combining these two pieces of prior art 
together to make the patent invention. The accused infringer 
 
 237. Id. at 1345 (distinguishing earlier CCPA precedent set forth in In re Bozek, 416 
F.2d 1385 (C.C.P.A. 1969)). 
 238. Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 357 F.3d 1270, 1272–73 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 239. Id. at 1273–74. 
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presented testimony that “the need for a connecting element” for a 
screw anchor “was widely known.”240 
Notably, the Ruiz court did not focus on whether this testimony 
was detailed or analyze how general knowledge in the art or the 
nature of the problem would provide a suggestion. Thus, under the 
evidentiary rule discerned from cases such as Princeton and Syntex, 
this conclusory testimony should not be able to establish a 
suggestion to combine. But, the court concluded that “a motivation 
to combine prior art references” can be found “in the nature of the 
problem to be solved.”241 
More importantly, the court noted that “[t]his form of 
motivation to combine evidence is particularly relevant with simpler 
mechanical technologies.”242 In Ruiz, such a simpler mechanical 
technology is present—an anchor screw and metal bracket used to 
secure foundations. In addition, the suggestion question presents an 
even easier technological question—would a person of ordinary skill 
look to using metal brackets to physically secure anchor screws 
already known in the art? With an easier technology to comprehend, 
the evidentiary standard governing undocumented suggestions is 
lowered. 
Such an analysis also explains the court’s conclusion in Battiston 
and Nylen. Both of these cases involve fairly straightforward, easily 
understood technologies. In Battiston, the technology at issue was a 
splash resistant pan for use with a commode.243 Two pieces of prior 
art taught all of the elements of the claimed splash resistant pan 
except the required rectangular opening. Instead, they disclosed an 
elongated opening.244 Another reference disclosed the claimed 
generally rectangular shape of the pan opening.245 The court affirmed 
the USPTO’s finding of obviousness, specifically finding substantial 
evidence to support the USPTO’s conclusion that a suggestion to 
combine “flow[ed] from the ordinary knowledge of one skilled in 
the art.”246 
 
 240. Id. at 1276. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. 
 243. In re Battiston, 139 F. App’x 281, 282–83 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 244. Id. at 283 (describing the contents of the Rose and APA references). 
 245. Id. (describing the Haskins reference as having an upper rim and four planar sides). 
 246. Id. at 283–84 (citing In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
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The court did not rely on any specific testimony or detailed 
explanation by the examiner or the Board to support the 
undocumented suggestion. However, the Federal Circuit still found 
evidence to support a suggestion coming solely from the general 
knowledge of the art. This appears to fly in the face of the reasoning 
set forth in Beasley and Lee. In those cases, the court specifically 
required evidence of a suggestion to combine to reach a minimum 
threshold.247 The USPTO needed to present “more than conclusory 
statements of generalized advantages and convenient assumptions 
about skilled artisans”; it needed to “point to some concrete 
evidence in the record in support” of a suggestion to combine.248 
Here, no such requirement is discussed or used.249 
A similar situation is presented in Nylen.250 Nylen involved the 
application for a patent covering an applicator bottle that combines a 
herbicide with a dye.251 This combination is used to help a user both 
direct the application of the herbicide and provide visual 
confirmation of the weeds treatment.252 The claimed herbicide was 
well known in the prior art, as was the combination of dyes with 
other agricultural chemicals.253 As the court noted, none of the prior 
art itself “indicat[ed] that they should be combined.”254 No other 
concrete evidence of a suggestion is identified in the opinion. 
However, the court still affirmed the USPTO’s finding of a 
suggestion based on the nature of the problem being solved. Again, 
 
 247. See In re Beasley, 117 F. App’x 739, 744 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 248. Id. (quoting In re Zurko, 258 F.3d 1379, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). 
 249. There is a possibility that the Board and examiner provided such detail and the 
Federal Circuit simply decided not to discuss it in the opinion. Such a situation is even more 
likely considering Battiston is an unpublished decision. 
  But the focus on the need for such evidence in another unpublished decision, 
Beasley, suggests otherwise. In Beasley, the court went to great lengths to explain both the basis 
for the USPTO’s finding of suggestion and how the basis lacked any evidence meeting the 
standards set forth in Lee. See Beasley, 117 F. App’x at 744. If such analysis encapsulated the 
full evidentiary requirement of the suggestion test, the court in Battiston would have either 
noted the existence of such detailed undocumented suggestion evidence or found no support 
for an undocumented suggestion. 
 250. In re Nylen, 97 F. App’x 293, 294 (Fed. Cir 2004). 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. 
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as in Battiston, the court appears to ignore the rule of evidence 
utilized in Lee and Beasley.255 
The lack of a heightened evidentiary requirement in both 
Battiston and Nylen is explained with the same reasoning used to 
explain the court’s analysis in Ruiz. The technological questions at 
issue are so simplistic that a rigorous evidentiary-like standard is not 
needed. In these cases, the court has modified the rule of evidence 
aspect of the suggestion test. As the complexity of the technology at 
issue decreases, so does the required detail of any evidence of an 
undocumented suggestion. 
The court in Beasley even mentions technological complexity 
when it applies the requirement that undocumented suggestion 
evidence include detailed analysis.256 The court needed to determine 
whether those skilled in the art appreciated the speed advantage of 
conventional computer memory over bit map memories and “the 
feasibility of substituting one for the other.”257 Such a factual inquiry 
stands in sharp contrast to the geometric shape of the splash pan 
design at issue in Battiston or the combination of dye and herbicide, 
instead of another agricultural chemical, in Nylen. The suggestion 
test’s rule of evidence required more detail in Beasley than in 
Battiston or Nylen because the technology in Beasley was much more 
sophisticated. 
This modification to the rule of evidence part of the suggestion 
test is further substantiated by the other suggestion test cases 
previously discussed.258 Princeton involved a patent on a capillary 
electrophoresis device, and Syntex considered a patent for anti-
 
 255. A critique similar to that discussed supra note 250 can be lodged against the court’s 
analysis in Nylen.  
 256. In re Beasley, 117 F. App’x 739, 744 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 257. Id. (discussing how such information can “hardly be described as a fact that is of 
‘instant and unquestionable demonstration’ for the purpose of taking official notice 
unsupported by any citation” (quoting In re Ahlert, 424 F.2d 1088, 1091 (C.C.P.A. 1970))).  
 258. This adjustment to the “rule of evidence” aspect of the suggestion test being 
discussed also falls in line with the requirements governing an examiner’s usage of common 
knowledge to establish a prima face case of obviousness. See MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING 
PROCEDURE § 2144.03 (8th ed., rev. 2, 2004). Some have argued that liberal use of this 
“official notice” provision improperly shifts the burden of proving nonobviousness to the 
patent applicant. See Dawn-Marie Bey, Shifting the Burden of Proving Patentability Vel Non in 
View of Dickinson v. Zurko, 12 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 18–28 (2004).  
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inflammatory eye drops.259 In both cases, the court considered an 
undocumented suggestion to combine, and the evidence of the 
undocumented suggestion presented met the heightened 
evidentiary-like test. Such evidence was required because the 
technologies at issue were fairly sophisticated. The same is true when 
looking at the facts of Cardiac Pacemaker, where the technology at 
issue was the design of a specific implantable cardiac defibrillator.260 
Such technology is complex, and thus, fairly detailed testimony was 
required to establish an undocumented motivation to combine. 
Detailed testimony was not presented, and, as a result, an 
undocumented suggestion could not be established.261 
The evidentiary aspect of the suggestion test, therefore, can be 
further refined. Detailed testimony is required to establish a 
suggestion to combine based on general knowledge in the art or 
nature of the problem. However, the level of detail required is 
related to the complexity of the technology at issue. As the 
technology becomes very complex, such as in Princeton or Cardiac 
Pacemaker, the court requires the testimony regarding an 
undocumented suggestion to match that complexity. If the 
technology is simple, such as in Ruiz and Battiston, admissible 
testimony on an undocumented suggestion can be simple as well. 
This reformulation of the suggestion test’s “rule of evidence” can be 
expressed graphically, as shown in Figure 1 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 259. See Princeton Biochemicals, Inc. v. Bekman Coulter, Inc., 411 F.3d 1332, 1335 
(Fed. Cir. 2005); Syntex (U.S.A.) LLC v. Apotex, Inc., 407 F.3d 1371, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 
2005). 
 260. See Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 381 F.3d 1371, 1373–74 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004). 
 261. Id. at 1376. 
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In Figure 1, the “rule of evidence” is represented as a function—
the dotted line in the center of the graph.262 If the level of detail and 
analysis in a particular testimony for a given technology meets or 
exceeds the value on this line, the evidence is “admissible” and can 
be considered. If the detail and analysis for a given technology falls 
below this line, the evidence is not “admissible.”263 Cases such as 
 
 262. Whether the relationship is a direct proportion, as depicted, or an asymptote that 
approaches infinity as the technology gets incredibly complex is not discernible from the cases 
discussed. The only aspect known for sure is that as the level of complexity increases, so does 
the required analysis for the evidence to be considered. There would be reason to believe that 
as the complexity gets greater, the demand for detail and analysis may increase at a faster rate—
creating an asymptotic relationship. Thus, the linear relationship shown is merely 
demonstrative and not a perfect representation of the aspect of the suggestion test being 
discussed. 
 263. This type of relationship is very similar to the one established by Federal Rule of 
Evidence 403. Rule 403 denies the admission of evidence where its probative value is 
“substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” FED. R. EVID. 403. Thus, as the 
evidence becomes more probative, the system’s tolerance for prejudicial effect increases. See 
ROGER C. PARK ET AL., EVIDENCE LAW 128–29 (2d ed. 2004). If the evidence has little 
probative value, the concern of any prejudice may keep the evidence out. Id. The probative 
versus prejudicial balancing required has the same direct relationship as the rule of evidence 
Complexity of Technology 
 
Detail and 
Analysis of 
Testimony 
"Admissible" 
Not 
"Admissible" 
"Rule of Evidence" 
FIGURE 1 
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Princeton and Syntex, involving fairly complex technologies, had very 
detailed testimony to support their claim of an undocumented 
suggestion. The testimony in these cases fell above the evidentiary-
like function shown in Figure 1 and was therefore available for 
consideration. This situation is comparable to that in Beasley where 
the technology was complex and little detail or analysis was 
presented by the USPTO. Evidence such as this falls below the 
function in Figure 1 and cannot establish a suggestion. 
The validity of this further refinement of the rule depicted in 
Figure 1 can be tested against the facts presented and ultimate 
decision in Teleflex. The patent in Teleflex described an adjustable 
pedal assembly for automobiles wherein the electronic throttle 
control is mounted to the support bracket as opposed to the pedal.264 
“This configuration avoids movement of the electronic control 
during adjustment of the pedal’s position on the assembly.”265 The 
complexity of the technology at issue does not rise to the level of the 
capillary electrophoresis device at issue in Princeton or the cardiac 
defibrillator at issue in Cardiac Pacemaker. However, an adjustable 
automobile pedal with electronic controls is not as simple as the 
splash pan at issue in Battiston. The technology sits slightly above the 
technology at issue in Ruiz. The pedal has electronic components so 
it is not solely a “simple[] mechanical technology.”266 But the 
electronic components play a minimal role and, thus, the invention’s 
sophistication is only slightly higher than the foundation anchors in 
Ruiz. 
Therefore, in order to establish an undocumented suggestion, 
the alleged infringer in Teleflex needed to provide testimony that had 
slightly more detail than that presented in Ruiz. In Ruiz, the court 
notes only that testimony on the issue was presented.267 No concern 
for its detail is discussed. Therefore, in Teleflex, something slightly 
more than a minimal amount of detail was needed. The litigants 
failed to provide any detail. Other than the prior art presented, the 
only testimony on suggestion indicated that the prior art “could have 
 
being discussed. As the level of detail and analysis of the testimony increases, the testimony 
becomes admissible for greater and greater complexities of technology. 
 264. Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int’l Co., 119 F. App’x 282, 283–84 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. 
granted, 126 S. Ct. 2965 (2006). 
 265. Id. at 284. 
 266. See Ruiz v. A.B. Chance, Co., 357 F.3d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 267. Id. 
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been” combined to make the invention and addressed a combination 
that was not the claimed invention.268 Any detail on the issue of 
suggestion was non-existent. Accordingly, because of the evidentiary 
aspect of the suggestion test, this testimony was not considered, and 
the grounds for proving a suggestion were limited to the prior art.269 
The testimony fell below the evidentiary-like function depicted in 
Figure 1 and was therefore not considered. 
VI. NORMATIVE EVALUATION OF THE SUGGESTION TEST’S “RULE 
OF EVIDENCE” 
The descriptive study performed above provides an 
understanding of exactly how the Federal Circuit is using the 
suggestion test. The test has not been limited to documented 
suggestions. Undocumented suggestions can still be used to prove a 
patented invention obvious. Things are not as prior-art-focused as 
recent critics would have one believe. 
However, the analysis cannot end with describing exactly how 
the court uses the suggestion test. An argument can still be made 
that the suggestion test’s rule of evidence produces harms similar to 
those produced by the narrow suggestion test. The rule necessarily 
limits the breadth of evidence that can prove an undocumented 
suggestion. With a smaller evidentiary basis to establish a suggestion 
to combine—thereby establishing obviousness—the result of the 
evidentiary-like aspect of the suggestion test may be a lowering of 
the nonobviousness requirement. Thus, while the suggestion test has 
not narrowed, as most critics believe, the test may still be hampering 
the proper operation of the nonobviousness requirement. 
This Part explores the impact the suggestion test’s rule of 
evidence has on the nonobviousness requirement. It begins with 
looking at the rule under evidence theory. Specifically, the 
suggestion test’s rule of evidence is examined to see if it helps 
maximize the likelihood that a correct determination of suggestion, 
and thus obviousness or nonobviousness is made by courts and the 
USPTO. While the rule is not a traditional rule of evidence,270 
looking at it under evidence theory helps to further tease out and 
 
 268. Teleflex, 119 F. App’x at 289 (detailing the declaration offered by the accused 
infringer, KSR). 
 269. Id. at 287–90. 
 270. See supra note 197. 
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test its evidentiary-like qualities. Second, the rule’s effect on the 
nonobviousness doctrine is discussed. This whole normative analysis 
revolves around whether the rule helps prevent both erroneous 
determinations of obviousness (Type I error) and nonobviousness 
(Type II error).271 From this analysis, the propriety of the rule of 
evidence is discerned. 
A. Rule Reduces Overvaluation of Suggestion Evidence 
One of the main purposes of evidence law is to ensure that “the 
truth may be ascertained” in a given judicial proceeding.272 The 
“overarching function of evidence law is to maximize the . . . 
probability that factfinders in our adjudicatory system will accurately 
determine objective historical truth.”273 Thus, evidence law is meant 
to maximize truth by “increas[ing] the frequency with which truth is 
ascertained.”274 Staying true to this part of evidence theory, the 
suggestion test’s rule of evidence is analyzed to see if it prevents 
overvaluation of suggestion evidence. 
 
 271. A “Type I error” is a false-positive, which in this context is a false finding of 
obviousness, while a “Type II error” is a false-negative, which in this context is a false finding 
of nonobviousness. See, e.g., Ian Ayers & Katherine K. Baker, A Separate Crime of Reckless Sex, 
72 U. CHI. L. REV. 599, 639–40 (2005) (discussing Type I and Type II errors in the context 
of criminal law); Alex Stein, Essay, Of Two Wrongs that Make a Right: Two Paradoxes of the 
Evidence Law and Their Combined Economic Justification, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1199, 1207 (2001) 
(discussing Type I and Type II errors in the context of evidence law). 
 272. FED. R. EVID. 102. 
 273. Michael L. Seigel, A Pragmatic Critique of Modern Evidence Scholarship, 88 NW. U. 
L. REV. 995, 996 (1994). Seigel uses the term “optimistic rationalism” to identify this “near-
universal[ly] accept[ed]” purpose of evidence law. See id. He critiques this optimistic 
rationalism, considering it too static and failing to consider any “postmodern jurisprudential 
perspectives.” Id. 
  For the purposes of this Article, the suggestion test’s rule of evidence will be 
evaluated under the traditional, truth maximization norm of evidence law. Evaluations under 
different evidence theories are left for another day and perhaps another author. 
 274. Ronald J. Allen & Brian Leiter, Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence, 
87 VA. L. REV. 1491, 1501 (2001) (“[A] majority of the rules of evidence have as their 
primary rationale their (alleged) truth-conducive virtues.”). 
  Evidence law has other justifications, such as “reducing accidents and avoiding 
litigation.” Id. at 1498–99 (citing FED. R. EVID. 407–411). In fact, most of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence can be evaluated under a law and economics approach. See, e.g., Richard A. 
Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477 (1999). This 
Article will focus on evaluating the rule of evidence aspect of the suggestion test under the 
primary rationale Allen and Leiter identify. 
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1. Dangers of overvaluation 
Overvaluation occurs when a trier of fact concludes that a piece 
of information places him or her closer to the truth than, in reality, 
the evidence actually does.275 That is, jurors, or a judge, assign more 
value to the evidence than it really provides. For example, 
overvaluation occurs if jurors assign a piece of evidence a value of 
five, when its correct value is three.276 For there to be a real threat of 
overvaluation, “it must be the case that what most people believe to 
be true”—that the evidence is valued at five in the given example—
“is in reality false.”277 
Overvaluation can reduce the accuracy of a factfinder’s 
conclusions.278 By concluding that a piece of evidence gets him or 
her closer to a particular truth than it does in actuality, the factfinder 
may ultimately be led astray. When the factfinder assumes a false 
notion, he may draw inferences that lead to more false beliefs. Thus, 
areas of evidence law attempt to minimize overvaluation by heavily 
monitoring the admission of types of evidence prone to 
overvaluation. 
The rules governing character evidence illustrate such an area of 
evidence law. Character evidence can have some probative value as to 
the correct result of a factual question.279 Character traits have some 
influence on behavior and, as a result, have some predictive value as 
to whether an individual did or did not act in line with her past 
 
 275. See Kenneth J. Melilli, The Character Evidence Rule Revisited, 1998 BYU L. REV. 
1547, 1598–1601 (discussing overvaluation in the setting of character evidence); see also 
Richard D. Friedman, “E” Is for Eclectic: Multiple Perspectives on Evidence, 87 VA. L. REV. 
2029, 2030 (2001). Notably, Friedman believes that this justification for evidence law has 
been overvalued itself. Id. (“[Overvaluation] has been given far too much credence in 
evidentiary discourse.”). “Exclusion is not justified on the basis of overvaluation unless the jury 
so massively overvalues the evidence that considering the evidence leads it further away from, 
rather than closer to, the truth.” Id. 
 276. See Melilli, supra note 275, at 1598 (setting forth an example to explain 
overvaluation of character evidence). 
 277. Id. 
 278. See id. 
 279. Id. at 1597–99; see also David P. Leonard, In Defense of the Character Evidence 
Prohibition: Foundations of the Rule Against Trial by Character, 73 IND. L.J. 1161, 1181–84 
(1998). Notably, Melilli and others conclude that overvaluation is not as significant a problem 
for character evidence as others may think. See Melilli, supra note 275, at 1599. 
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actions.280 However, a trier of fact may have the propensity to ignore 
the real possibility that someone acted out of character. In such an 
instance, character evidence is overvalued. The factfinder may weigh 
the character evidence so heavily as to ignore other objective 
evidence to the contrary.281 In order to avoid this overvaluation, 
evidence law limits the admissibility of character evidence.282 
Scientific evidence may also be overvalued. Evidence on issues of 
science, particularly expert evidence, usually “presents information or 
a perspective that is unfamiliar to most jurors and judges.”283 Because 
of this lack of familiarity, such evidence is extremely important to the 
factfinder and also has the “power to persuade.”284 A factfinder is 
likely to give scientific evidence the full value for which it is offered 
because he or she is uncomfortable discounting it.285 Thus, scientific 
evidence that has little absolute value has the propensity to be 
overvalued by the factfinder, leading to unfair results.286 
Overvaluation occurs not because the factfinder increases the 
evidence’s value, as with character evidence, but because the 
factfinder is unlikely to properly decrease the evidence’s value. In an 
attempt to prevent overvaluation, evidence law asks the court to act 
as the gatekeeper for this type of evidence.287 Courts are asked to 
ensure that only reliable expert evidence is admitted. Federal Rule of 
Evidence 702 requires that expert testimony be “based upon 
sufficient facts or data” and that it be “the product of reliable 
principles and methods.”288 This focus on reliability attempts to 
ensure that the conclusions offered by the expert are more likely to 
 
 280. See Leonard, supra note 279, at 1182 (“[I]t has long been believed that evidence of 
character satisfies the lenient test of logical relevance when offered as proof of conduct.”). 
Leonard notes that this conclusion has been challenged. Id. at 1182 n.89. 
 281. See id. at 1184. This overvaluing is the product of “inferential error prejudice.” Id. 
There is empirical work that suggests the opposite, that factfinders do not tend to overvalue. 
See Melilli, supra note 275, at 1599. 
 282. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404 (limiting, generally, the admission of character evidence 
to prove conduct). 
 283. Friedman, supra note 275, at 2048. 
 284. Id. 
 285. See D.H. Kaye, The Dynamics of Daubert: Methodology, Conclusions, and Fit in 
Statistical and Econometric Studies, 87 VA. L. REV. 1933, 1939 (2001) (“Courts fear that 
[scientific evidence] comes cloaked in an aura of infallibility and that this leads jurors to give it 
more credence than it deserves.”). 
 286. Friedman, supra note 275, at 2048. 
 287. See FED. R. EVID. 702; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993). 
 288. FED. R. EVID. 702. 
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be true than not.289 Thus, the rule of evidence helps to ensure that 
when the factfinder accepts the expert’s conclusions, what he or she 
is accepting is more likely to be the full truth on a given issue. 
2. Rule mitigates the hindsight bias 
Evidence of a suggestion presents similar problems of 
overvaluation in the form of hindsight bias. As already explained, the 
mere existence of the invention makes it easier for the factfinder to 
conceptualize the invention’s creation and thus introduces hindsight 
bias into the nonobviousness inquiry.290 This bias prompts 
overvaluation of certain evidence by the factfinder. The factfinder 
may assign more value to facts such as the current existence of the 
patentee’s invention and the existence of the elements of the 
invention in different pieces of prior art than this evidence necessarily 
provides.291 This hindsight bias, by prompting this overvaluation, 
brings the factfinder closer to a finding of obviousness than the 
evidence truly establishes. 
The substantive part of the suggestion test is meant to de-bias 
the factfinder.292 By requiring the factfinder to conclude that there 
was a suggestion to combine, the factfinder is required to 
substantiate his or her hindsight bias in evidence. A reason to 
combine the prior art must come from a specific informational 
source in existence at the time of the invention: the prior art, general 
knowledge in the art, or the nature of the problem.293 The present 
existence of the invention or elements of the invention in the past is 
not enough to warrant a finding of obviousness.294 Another fact must 
 
 289. Friedman, supra note 275, at 2049. 
 290. See In re Kotzab, 217 F.3d 1365, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[T]he very ease with 
which the invention can be understood may prompt one ‘to fall victim to the insidious effect of 
a hindsight syndrome wherein that which only the invention taught is used against its 
teacher.’” (quoting W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1553 (Fed. 
Cir. 1983))); Mandel, supra note 62, at 6–7; supra Part II.B. 
 291. See Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 227 F.3d 1361, 1371–72 (Fed. Cir. 
2000). The mere fact that each element of the patented invention can be found in the prior art 
does not render the claims obvious. See Princeton Biochemicals, Inc. v. Bekman Coulter, Inc., 
411 F.3d 1332, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  
 292. See Nat’l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry., 357 F.3d 1319, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 
2004). 
 293. See supra Part II.B. 
 294. See In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1999), abrogated by In re 
Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
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be proven: a suggestion or motivation to combine the prior art that 
existed at the time of the invention’s creation.295 The bias alone 
cannot result in a finding of obviousness. 
Overvaluation through hindsight bias is similar to the 
overvaluation associated with character evidence. Character evidence 
can be seen as creating a “forward bias.” Character evidence provides 
a factfinder information regarding how that individual has acted in 
the past. Factfinders are likely to overvalue this evidence from the 
past because there is a tendency to believe that the past is a perfect 
indicator of future action.296 Evidence of what has occurred ex ante 
overinfluences a factfinder’s evaluation of a specific, ex post, action. 
Character evidence, therefore, creates a forward-looking bias. 
Hindsight bias creates overvaluation in a similar way, only it works in 
the opposite direction. The invention’s existence causes a decision-
maker to believe what is presently true is a perfect indicator for what 
would have happened in the past. 
Of specific importance for the suggestion test’s rule of evidence 
is the fact that hindsight bias also affects the factfinder’s valuation of 
the suggestion evidence itself. The hindsight bias lens is not 
magically removed when the factfinder is evaluating evidence of a 
suggestion to combine.297 The continued existence of hindsight bias 
causes the factfinder to have a predilection toward seeing a 
suggestion in places where it does not exist or where support for its 
existence is extremely weak. Hindsight bias can lead to the 
overvaluation of the very tool meant to mitigate the bias. Thus, 
another legal tool is needed to insulate the suggestion test from 
being infected with bias as well. 
The evidentiary-like aspect of the suggestion test adds the 
needed extra layer of protection against hindsight bias and, thus, 
overvaluation. The suggestion test’s rule of evidence requires either 
that evidence of suggestion be grounded in the prior art or that 
testimony given regarding an undocumented suggestion is of a 
requisite level of detail and analysis.298 This requisite level is defined 
by the level of complexity of the technology at issue.299 By 
 
 295. See Nat’l Steel Car, 357 F.3d at 1337. 
 296. See Leonard, supra note 279, at 1181–83. 
 297. See, e.g., Mandel, supra note 62, at 16–17 (performing a study that concluded that 
even instructions directed at de-biasing a decision-maker have little effect). 
 298. See supra Part V.A. 
 299. See supra Part V.B. 
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introducing additional requirements for the admissibility of 
undocumented suggestion evidence, the rule helps mitigate the 
effects of hindsight bias on the main substantive suggestion inquiry. 
The rule prevents hindsight bias because it is formulated to 
admit suggestion evidence whose traits make it less susceptible to 
being overvalued. First, the rule allows all prior art to be considered 
as possibly establishing a suggestion.300 Prior art is documentary 
evidence that was available to one skilled in the art at the time of the 
invention.301 This information, by definition, is formulated and fixed 
ex ante.302 It therefore cannot be influenced by the patented 
invention’s existence. The drafter of the art did not know of the 
patented invention and could not be affected by the hindsight bias. 
In addition, the information contained therein was not created in 
response to the particular litigation or proceeding at issue. Prior art is 
not written with knowledge of the nonobviousness analysis taking 
place. This makes the information contained within the prior art a 
further step removed from any possible effects of hindsight bias. 
Finally, the possible suggestion in the prior art speaks for itself. Prior 
art is not inherently accompanied by a narration of a fact witness or 
expert.303 Instead, the words or drawings in the reference are relied 
upon by themselves to establish a suggestion to combine the prior 
art references. This further insulates the art’s teachings from the 
hindsight bias. 
Adding to this potential for overvaluation is the fact that the 
undocumented suggestions are perfect homes for a decision-maker’s 
hindsight bias. The prior art says what it says. Hindsight bias can 
color one’s view of the meaning of a specific text or diagram 
contained within the prior art. But the bias has a limited amount of 
 
 300. See, e.g., Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int’l Co., 119 F. App’x 282, 288–89 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(evaluating the prior art to see if it established a suggestion), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2965 
(2006). 
 301. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000) (detailing what qualifies as prior art in patent law). 
 302. See id. 
 303. Testimony can accompany the prior art. This testimony would be influenced by 
hindsight bias and would not be directly addressed by the rule of evidence articulated. See 
supra Part V.A (indicating that the suggestion test’s rule of evidence is focused solely on 
undocumented suggestion evidence). However, information in the prior art is not affected by 
hindsight and can check the testimony. The prior art limits the amount of overvaluation that 
can occur. 
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information with which to play.304 Such natural limitations are not 
present when it comes to undocumented general knowledge in the 
art or the nature of the problem being solved. How this general 
knowledge and the problem the invention addresses would have 
affected a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the 
invention is much more amorphous. This lack of tangibleness gives 
much more wiggle room to the factfinder. These factors make an 
undocumented basis for suggestion the path of least resistance to 
ground the hindsight bias in evidence of suggestion. 
The suggestion test’s rule of evidence minimizes the hindsight 
bias effects on undocumented evidence by requiring such evidence 
include a requisite level of detail and analysis. Requiring such 
testimony to be thorough and complete mitigates overvaluation by 
both the testifier and the factfinder. First, a requirement of rigor 
forces the testifier to articulate why she concludes general knowledge 
or the nature of the problem provides a suggestion to combine.305 
Conclusory statements or mere argumentation are not enough.306 
The rule forces the testimony to go further, beyond statements that 
could be supported by bias alone, and provide detailed reasoning as 
to the foundation for and conclusion of suggestion.307 Thus, the 
USPTO’s mere conclusion in Beasley that one of ordinary skill would 
have known the advantages of conventional memory over bit map 
memory, and thus substituted one for the other, could easily be 
prompted by hindsight bias alone.308 Bias does not, however, create 
reasoning and analysis for this conclusion. For example, the detail 
and analysis in Dr. Jorgenson’s testimony in Princeton explaining 
exactly how one of ordinary skill would possess knowledge to coil 
and secure a capillary tube is more likely the product of Dr. 
 
 304. The universe of prior art is expressly limited by statute. See 35 U.S.C. § 102. Section 
102 establishes a set of detailed rules defining what can, and cannot, be considered prior art. 
See id. 
 305. See, e.g., In re Beasley, 117 F. App’x 739, 742–44 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (requiring the 
USPTO to specifically articulate how knowledge in the art creates a suggestion to combine); 
see also supra Part V.B. 
 306. See, e.g., In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (finding the 
Administrative Procedure Act requires more than conclusory statements or common sense 
findings). 
 307. Hindsight can influence this reasoning; but, presumably, the more detail that is 
required, the less likely mere bias can support the creation of particular details and analysis. In a 
sense, by requiring detail and analysis, the testifier must confront her own bias and either 
ground it in detailed analysis or have her testimony ignored. 
 308. Beasley, 117 F. App’x at 741–44. 
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Jorgenson’s grounded, rational belief in the suggestion than it is of 
bias.309 Requiring thorough analysis de-biases testimony on 
suggestion. 
Overvaluation by the factfinder is also mitigated. Undocumented 
grounds of suggestion lend themselves to hindsight bias. The 
conclusion that an invention was easy to create is simpler to realize 
through the vehicles of general knowledge in the art or the nature of 
the problem being solved as opposed to the prior art itself.310 And 
when such undocumented suggestions can be established through 
conclusory testimony or even argumentation, it becomes even easier 
for a factfinder to find support for their hindsight bias. Simple 
statements such as “anyone knowledgeable of the prior art would 
have known how to create the invention” are easy to accept when 
one is already preconditioned to the ultimate conclusion. But as the 
testimony becomes more complex, the factfinder is faced with actual 
detail and analysis that must be evaluated. The testimony presents 
more than the conclusion the hindsight bias favors. This increase in 
complexity forces the factfinder, as it does the testifier, to truly 
consider the question of suggestion instead of simply relying on 
hindsight bias. In turn, the testimony the rule of evidence admits is 
testimony that a factfinder is less likely to overvalue. 
The rule of evidence does allow the required detail of the 
evidence to decrease as the level of complexity of the patent 
technology decreases.311 Accordingly, the protection against 
hindsight bias and overvaluation decreases as the technology at issue 
becomes simpler. It might seem intuitive that such a decrease would 
be detrimental because the effects of hindsight bias are greater in 
simple technology cases.312 Because the technology is so simple, it 
becomes even easier for the factfinder to conceptualize the 
invention’s creation.313 However, while there is some logic behind 
 
 309. See Princeton Biochemicals, Inc. v. Beckman Coulter, Inc., 411 F.3d 1332, 1338–
39 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 310. It is easier to conclude that something is obvious because those in the field would 
have generally known how to create such an invention or that the problem itself prompted the 
invention. These undocumented suggestion categories are unstructured by design, and the lack 
of firm boundaries lends them to easy use in rhetorical statements and conclusions of an 
invention’s obviousness. 
 311. See supra Part V.B. 
 312. See McGinley v. Franklin Sports, Inc., 262 F.3d 1339, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 
(finding simple art creates the temptation of hindsight bias). 
 313. See id. 
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this line of thinking, the opposite is actually true: “[H]indsight bias 
tends to be stronger where an outcome is unexpected.”314 In 
addition, the effects of bias generally increase the more unfamiliar 
the decision-maker is with the subject matter at issue. So, the more 
sophisticated the technological advance, the higher likelihood 
evaluation of this advance will be influenced by hindsight bias.315 As 
technological complexity increases, the decision-maker is coming 
upon increasingly unfamiliar territory and, as a result, is less likely to 
try to reason out a specific answer. Accordingly, the decision-maker 
is more likely to cave in to the influence of hindsight bias.316 The rule 
of evidence aspect of the suggestion test is thus tailored to increase 
its defense against hindsight bias and overvaluation by requiring 
more rigor in admissible testimony.317 
3. Rule increases reliability 
The rule of evidence part of the suggestion test also increases the 
reliability of the evidence admitted. Some of the analysis contrasting 
documented versus undocumented suggestion evidence with regards 
to hindsight bias applies equally to issues of reliability. Prior art 
evidence of a suggestion to combine is inherently reliable because of 
its defining characteristics. As previously mentioned, prior art is 
drafted well before the proceedings in which it is used.318 It is most 
likely created by one of skill in the art and its intended audience is 
others in the same technological area, not a judge or jury.319 
Therefore, suggestions from prior art are reliable because the 
information provided is independent and insulated from the 
 
 314. See Mandel, supra note 62, at 10–11 (citing David A. Schkade & Lynda M. 
Kilbourne, Expectation-Outcome Consistency and Hindsight Bias, 49 ORGANIZATIONAL 
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 105, 106–07 (1991)). 
 315. See id. at 11. 
 316. See id. 
 317. See supra Part V.B., Figure 1. 
 318. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000) (requiring prior art to be in existence before the date 
of invention). But see id. § 102(b) (identifying a class of prior art that can exist after the initial 
invention if the art also existed more than one year prior to the filing date of a patent on that 
invention). 
 319. Prior art can be created by those of a higher or lower skill than the ordinary skill in 
the art. In addition, the art may be intended for a different audience. See, e.g., Phillips v. AWH 
Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1322–23 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (noting that a patentee may act as 
her own lexicographer and give a term a different definition than its ordinary meaning). 
However, these types of variations are unlikely. 
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motivations of the judicial environment.320 In addition, the extent of 
information prior art can provide is limited to the text and diagrams 
contained within the prior art. This documentation is self-
authenticating. Just as the concreteness of prior art helps to reduce 
the hindsight bias, it also increases the reliability of any suggestion 
contained therein. Similar built-in reliability measures are not present 
in testimony speaking to an undocumented suggestion. For example, 
the testimony is made specifically for the nonobviousness inquiry. Its 
conclusion, therefore, may be driven by the desire for a particular 
outcome.321 
The rule of evidence aspect to the suggestion test attempts to 
graft some reliability safeguards into evidence of an undocumented 
suggestion. The rule requires testimony to contain detail and 
analysis. The testimony must detail the general knowledge in the art 
or the nature of the problem being solved and then explain why such 
information creates a suggestion to combine or modify the prior art 
to practice the invention.322 Mere argumentation or conclusory 
statements of undocumented suggestion cannot form the basis of a 
finding of suggestion.323 The USPTO cannot simply assert that, for 
example, those of skill in the art know that conventional memory is 
better than bit map memory and are likely to substitute one for the 
other.324 This statement, standing by itself, is tough to evaluate for 
its truthfulness. More information as to why this fact is known to 
those of skill in the art is needed. In addition, some reasoning as to 
why that person would swap these types of memory would lend 
more credence to the statements ultimate conclusion of suggestion. 
The requirement for a detailed analysis is a proxy to ensure the 
testimony’s contents are reliable.325 When the testifier explains in 
 
 320. See Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202–03 (Fed. Cir. 
2002) (touting the use of dictionaries in interpreting patent claims because they are 
“unbiased” and “not influenced by expert testimony or events subsequent to . . . the grant of 
the patent, not colored by motives of the parties, and not inspired by litigation”). The 
understanding of prior art can be influenced by that information which is inherent to one of 
ordinary skill in the art. See In re Cruciferous Sprout Litig., 301 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 
2002) (explaining the concept of inherency). However, the information is still grounded in the 
fixed, documentary evidence that makes up prior art. 
 321. Cf. Tex. Digital Sys., 308 F.3d at 1202–03. 
 322. See supra Part V.A. 
 323. See, e.g., In re Beasley, 117 F. App’x 739, 742–44 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 324. See id. 
 325. See, e.g., Syntex (U.S.A.) LLC v. Apotex, 407 F.3d 1371, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(detailing the expert’s testimony).  
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detail why a conclusion of suggestion was reached, that conclusion 
has a higher likelihood of being true. The required additional 
reasoning will either further flesh out a testifier’s conclusion 
regarding an undocumented suggestion or exclude, or deter, a 
testifier from reaching an incorrect conclusion on suggestion. 
The suggestion test’s rule of evidence operates in a similar 
fashion to Daubert requirements for the admission of expert 
testimony. Ensuring reliability is the goal of the admissibility 
requirements governing expert testimony.326 To meet this goal, 
courts are required to resolve, as a threshold matter, whether the 
methodology an expert uses to reach a particular conclusion is sound 
enough to deem the conclusion reliable.327 Testimony from experts 
whose methodologies are considered flawed are unreliable and, thus, 
inadmissible. This lack of reliability suggests that the conclusions are 
more likely false than true.328 Because there is presumed systematic 
overvaluation of expert testimony by factfinders, the judicial system 
cannot risk admitting unreliable expert evidence if the system’s goal 
is to maximize the likelihood of finding truth.329 
Testimony regarding a suggestion to combine from general 
knowledge or the nature of the problem does not necessarily rise to 
the level of expert testimony. Such testimony can come from fact 
witnesses. But the testimony’s contents and the question the 
testimony addresses raise similar concerns of overvaluation as expert 
testimony. The testimony addresses a factual issue with which a 
factfinder is most likely unfamiliar—whether, in a given technological 
field, a person having a certain level of training in that technology 
would have been motivated to combine or modify what had already 
been done to create the patent invention.330 The question of a 
 
 326. See Friedman, supra note 275, at 2049–50; Jennifer L. Mnookin, Scripting 
Expertise: The History of Handwriting Identification Evidence and the Judicial Construction of 
Reliability, 87 VA. L. REV. 1723, 1735 (2001). 
 327. The current focus is on ensuring the methodology the expert uses to reach her 
conclusions is sound. See David S. Caudill & Lewis H. LaRue, Why Judges Applying the 
Daubert Trilogy Need To Know About the Social, Institutional, and Rhetorical—and Not Just 
the Methodological—Aspects of Science, 45 B.C. L. REV. 1, 13–18 (discussing the Daubert 
trilogy). Caudill and LaRue conclude that more than methodology should be considered when 
testing the reliability, and thus the scientific correctness, of an expert’s testimony. Id. at 51–53. 
 328. See Friedman, supra note 275, at 2050. 
 329. See Kaye, supra note 285, at 1939–40 (explaining that jurors might give too much 
weight to scientific evidence and, thus, hinder justice). 
 330. See supra Part II.B. 
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suggestion is also very technical because of the nature of the 
invention at issue.331 The factfinder, therefore, just as with an expert, 
will need to rely heavily on the testimony regarding suggestion. 
Because of unfamiliarity with the issues presented, the factfinder may 
have a propensity for crediting the testimony in its entirety. Under 
these circumstances, as with expert evidence, the reliability of the 
evidence presented becomes extremely important. The suggestion 
test’s rule of evidence reacts to this situation and, in turn, attempts 
to ensure reliability by requiring detailed and thorough analysis for 
testimony to be available for consideration. 
The rule further tailors its assurances of reliability by tuning the 
required detail and analysis of testimony on suggestion to the level of 
technology at issue. As the complexity of technology increases, the 
subject matter becomes increasingly unfamiliar to the factfinder. The 
factfinder, accordingly, will increase their reliance on the testimony 
on an undocumented suggestion. For example, a jury is more likely 
to fully rely on testimony regarding a capillary electrophoresis device 
than testimony on a splash pan.332 With this increase in reliance, the 
fear of overvaluation and need for reliability grows.333 The rule 
adjusts accordingly, requiring more detail for the testimony to be 
admissible. 
B. Rule’s Effect on the Correctness of Nonobviousness Decisions 
The suggestion test’s rule of evidence reduces overvaluation of 
suggestion evidence. But, for a complete normative evaluation of the 
rule, the rule’s impact on substantive nonobviousness law needs to 
be examined. By reducing overvaluation of suggestion evidence, the 
rule helps the nonobviousness requirement to operate properly. 
However, the rule, by definition, excludes some evidence of 
undocumented suggestion from consideration, potentially 
hampering one’s ability to challenge a patent claim’s 
nonobviousness. The question becomes whether these substantive 
effects of the suggestion test’s rule of evidence, on balance, maintain 
or frustrate the balance between incentives and competition that the 
nonobviousness doctrine is trying to preserve. To put it simply, does 
 
 331. See id. 
 332. Compare Princeton Biochemicals, Inc. v. Bekman Coulter, Inc., 411 F.3d 1332, 
1334–35 (Fed. Cir. 2005), with In re Battiston, 139 F. App’x 281, 282–83 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 333. See, e.g., Kaye, supra note 285, at 1939–40. 
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the rule increase the likelihood that courts and the USPTO will 
make correct determinations on nonobviousness? To better answer 
this question, the following section examines the rule’s effect on 
both Type I and Type II errors. 
1. Rule reduces Type I errors 
Type I errors occur when a court or the USPTO finds a patent 
claim obvious when, in actuality, it is not.334 That is, the claimed 
invention is found unpatentable even though it describes an 
invention that is a significant technological advance over the prior art 
and would not have been created absent the incentive of patent 
protection.335 The suggestion test, when operating properly, does 
not find a suggestion when these two conditions are present.336 The 
problem, detailed above, is that evidence of an undocumented 
suggestion has certain inherent attributes that lead to a finding of 
suggestion when a suggestion is actually absent.337 These factors 
create Type I errors because they cause suggestions to be found 
where they are not, and these false suggestions lead to false 
conclusions of obviousness. 
The suggestion test’s rule of evidence reduces overvaluation of 
suggestion evidence. As a result, the rule reduces the number of false 
findings of suggestion, which in turn results in less false findings of 
obviousness. Without a factual finding of suggestion, a court or the 
USPTO cannot hold a patent claim invalid because of obviousness. 
The rule, therefore, prevents possible Type I errors by increasing the 
likelihood that suggestion findings are accurate. This evidentiary 
aspect of the suggestion test helps to ensure the correctness of 
determinations of obviousness. 
 
 334. See supra note 271. 
 335. See supra Part II. 
 336. See supra Part II.B. 
 337. A factfinder or testifier, because of the hindsight bias, may find a suggestion when it 
is, in truth, not present. A factfinder may also completely credit testimony supporting an 
undocumented suggestion when, in reality, the testimony is unreliable and it is likely that the 
suggestion does not exist. 
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2. Rule fails to address and may create Type II errors 
Type II errors occur when a court or the USPTO finds a patent 
claim nonobvious when, in actuality, it is not.338 The suggestion 
test’s rule of evidence does little to ensure the correctness of 
determinations of nonobviousness. All of the evidentiary aspects of 
the suggestion test discussed guard against the overvaluation of 
evidence of obviousness. The rule ensures that evidence regarding an 
undocumented suggestion is less susceptible to hindsight bias and 
more reliable. But hindsight bias and the lack of reliability have only 
a tendency to produce incorrect findings of obviousness. These 
overvaluing effects do not operate in the other direction. They do 
not have a propensity to improperly push the factfinder to a finding 
of nonobviousness. The overvaluation the suggestion test’s rule of 
evidence addresses is a one-way ratchet—making a finding of 
obviousness more likely in those cases where the invention is truly 
nonobvious. The elimination of overvaluation of suggestion evidence 
does not address possible Type II errors. 
In fact, the suggestion test’s rule of evidence may even introduce 
Type II errors of its own. In practice, the rule may have the same, or 
similar, effect as the narrow suggestion test because the rule 
necessarily limits the scope of available evidence to prove an 
undocumented suggestion. The rule also introduces costs, by 
requiring more detail and analysis, that can further limit the ability 
for litigants, the USPTO, and other patent observers to avail 
themselves of undocumented suggestions to evaluate and invalidate 
patent claims. 
The rule of evidence increases the cost of challenging a patent in 
litigation on obviousness grounds. The rule requires testimony that 
includes detailed analysis. To get such testimony will require, in most 
cases, the hiring of an expert. This expert will need to be paid for a 
lengthy report and testimony in order to meet the requirements of 
the suggestion test’s evidentiary rule. Litigants will either need to 
devote significant resources to proving obviousness or will be 
discouraged from bringing a challenge altogether because of the 
costs imposed by the rule. These costs become even more significant 
when patent observers—potential licenses or those in a pre-litigation 
posture—want to evaluate a patent’s nonobviousness. Accessing, 
 
 338. See supra note 271. 
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creating, and evaluating detailed analysis of an undocumented 
suggestion in such situations produce litigation type costs in settings 
where such costs are usually not expected, and, as a result, are even 
more burdensome. 
Barrier creating costs would also be experienced at the USPTO. 
A patent examiner does not have the ability to produce detailed 
testimony to support a finding of undocumented suggestion.339 The 
USPTO does not have the resources or procedural tools through 
which it can solicit testimony to establish what was generally known 
to a particular art field. The rule would thus result in a de facto 
narrow suggestion test at the USPTO. 
This lack of availability of undocumented suggestions would lead 
to incorrect findings of nonobviousness. In technological areas 
where suggestions are unlikely to be fixed and available on paper, 
such as the software and business method areas, access to 
undocumented suggestions is necessary to properly determine 
whether inventions in the technologies are truly nonobvious.340 
Undocumented suggestions also allow the nonobviousness 
requirement to operate properly where well-known principles and 
concepts are not memorialized.341 Without the undocumented 
suggestion categories, inventions that were obvious at the time of 
their creation will still be held nonobvious due to the lack of 
documented evidence of suggestion.342 A Type II error is therefore 
introduced—a finding of nonobviousness when the invention is 
actually obvious. The rule of evidence, by de facto limiting access to 
undocumented suggestions, may produce Type II errors. 
The barriers created by the suggestion test’s rule of evidence are 
a little overstated, particularly in the litigation setting. First, the rule 
does not go as far as the narrow suggestion test because the rule 
does not completely change the substantive part of the suggestion 
test. A suggestion to combine can still be based on an 
undocumented suggestion—general knowledge in the art or the 
nature of the problem being solved.343 Prior art is not the only 
source for suggestion. Evidence to establish an undocumented 
 
 339. See Rai, supra note 94, at 912–17. 
 340. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 86, at 88–90. 
 341. See id.; FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 9, ch. 4, at 40. 
 342. Id.; Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 888.  
 343. See, e.g., Syntex (U.S.A.) LLC v. Apotex, 407 F.3d 1371, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 
2005); see also supra Part III. 
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suggestion does need to meet the detail and analysis required under 
the rule. But, unlike the narrow suggestion test, establishing an 
undocumented suggestion is still possible. The general parameters of 
the broad suggestion test are not disturbed. 
Additionally, in the litigation setting, the added requirement of 
detail and analysis from a testifier on an undocumented suggestion 
adds minimal costs. Patent litigations cost, on average, about 
$800,000 for each party through the end of discovery and about 
$1,500,000 for each party through trial and appeal.344 Also, the 
usage of experts in patent litigation by both parties on issues of 
infringement and validity is ubiquitous.345 In light of the overall high 
cost of litigation and required hiring and use of experts, the addition 
of some detail and analysis from one of those experts is minimal at 
best. Those situations where a litigant is deterred from pursuing an 
obviousness theory based on an undocumented suggestion because 
of the rule would most likely not be Type II error situations. Instead, 
that litigant is already deterred by the costs of patent litigation in 
general or, in reality, no undocumented suggestion exists. 
Otherwise, a litigant should easily be able to use an expert who can 
add detail and analysis to their testimony to meet the rule’s 
requirements. 
Outside the litigation setting, the full and complete discussion of 
any issue of infringement or validity is also expensive. A reliable legal 
opinion on a patent’s validity or infringement may cost tens of 
thousands of dollars and can, in certain circumstances, cost well over 
$100,000.346 Again, the additional costs associated with the rule are 
likely minimal in comparison. In addition, the rule has the benefit of 
forcing a patent observer to come to terms with the substance of the 
possible undocumented suggestion. Requiring some detail and 
analysis allows the observer to better test the strength of a patent’s 
nonobviousness. 
 
 344. See Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 
1, 16 (2005) (citing AIPLA Report of Economic Survey (of U.S. IP Practitioners) (1999)).  
 345. See Edward G. Poplawski, Selection and Use of Experts in Patent Cases, 27 AIPLA 
Q.J. 1, 3 (1999) (stating that patent litigation “dictate[s] that expert testimony is virtually 
essential in assisting the trier of fact to understand the evidence and to resolve factual issues in 
litigation”). 
 346. See, e.g., Edwin H. Taylor & Gleen E. Von Tersch, A Proposal To Shore Up the 
Foundations of Patent Law that the Underwater Line Eroded, 20 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. 
L.J. 721, 740 (1998). 
COTROPIA.MRO.DOC 1/20/2007 1:08:43 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2006 
1580 
In the patent office setting, the USPTO does have avenues for 
producing admissible “evidence.” Patent examiners can, by rule, 
provide an affidavit describing “the facts within the personal 
knowledge of an employee of the [USPTO].”347 Patent examiners 
can also request evidence to substantiate an undocumented 
suggestion from the applicant.348 And the case law does not require 
detailed analysis to come in the form of testimony via an affidavit or 
declaration. Cases such as Lee and Beasley simply call for the USPTO 
to “articulate[] and place[] on the record” any knowledge they may 
rely upon to “negate patentability.”349 “Testimony” can consist of a 
statement made by the examiner or Board. For the testimony to be 
admissible, it must be detailed and set forth the pertinent analysis. 
Even in those instances where the rule of evidence may call for more 
detail and analysis, the USPTO has the tools to create “admissible” 
evidence without too much administrative burden. 
Furthermore, the suggestion test’s rule of evidence is tailored to 
minimize costs in those instances where the fear of overvaluation is 
small. As the invention’s technological complexity decreases, so does 
the stringency of the rule’s requirements.350 Thus, the simpler the 
technology at issue, the lower the costs on those trying to prove the 
invention is obvious. This lessening of the standard for admissibility 
coincides with those circumstances where hindsight bias is not as 
strong and the factfinder can better test the reliability of the 
testimony on their own.351 These are also the instances where critics 
see the highest likelihood for Type II errors. Simple technological 
areas, such as business method invention, and information so well 
known in an industry it is not documented are the areas where 
commentators believe the reliance on undocumented suggestions is 
most needed.352 In these situations, the rule of evidence’s 
requirement for detail will be at its lowest, and thus the costs the rule 
creates will also be low. The rule’s balancing between the detail and 
 
 347. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.104(d)(2) (2004) (“[The] data shall be as specific as possible.”). 
 348. See id. § 1.105(a)(1) (indicating that the examiner may request “information as may 
be reasonably necessary to properly examine”). 
 349. In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see also In re Beasley, 117 F. 
App’x 739, 743–44 (Fed. Cir. 2004).  
 350. See supra Part V.B. 
 351. See supra Part VI.A. 
 352. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 9, ch. 4, at 40 (discussing the need for 
undocumented suggestions to properly determine a business method’s nonobviousness). 
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analysis required compared to the difficulty of technology at issue 
addresses the concerns of the ability to prove an obvious invention 
obvious. 
This sliding scale aspect of the rule will also make it easier for the 
USPTO to establish obviousness in those simple technological cases. 
Both Battiston and Nylen are perfect examples of this facet of the 
rule in action. In both cases, the USPTO offered only rather terse 
analysis as to why general knowledge in the art or the nature of the 
problem being solved provided a suggestion to combine the prior art 
to make the applied-for invention.353 This was enough because the 
technology at issue was simple. 
With all of this being said, the suggestion test’s rule of evidence 
could be modified to prevent Type II errors. In particular, the rule’s 
requirements could be relaxed in the USPTO setting. Under such a 
relaxation, courts would consider more undocumented suggestions 
admissible for a given level of technological complexity when the 
issue of obviousness is being decided by the USPTO. Put another 
way, the “rule” depicted in Figure 1 would be adjusted downward, 
increasing the area of “admissible” evidence of suggestion. 
While the office has access to detailed and thorough testimony, 
such access is not as readily available as in the litigation setting. In 
addition, the time and monetary resources are just not present at the 
USPTO to fully flesh out undocumented suggestions in all cases 
where such suggestions are truly present, but the suggestion test’s 
rule of evidence cannot be met. Finally, the fear of creating Type I 
errors is less in the USPTO setting because the factfinder—the 
examiner—is experienced in the relevant technical field. They are, 
thus, better equipped to avoid hindsight and question the reliability 
of technical evidence themselves.354 
Furthermore, these Type II errors in the examination process can 
be particularly harmful because such errors cause the nonobviousness 
standard to be ineffective at the beginning of the patent process. For 
the system to work properly, obvious patents should not issue from 
the USPTO. When they do, the social costs are high because the 
patented invention’s obviousness can only be established through 
 
 353. See In re Battiston, 139 F. App’x 281, 283–84 (Fed. Cir. 2005); In re Nylen, 97 F. 
App’x 293, 294 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 354. Because of the factfinder’s sophistication and familiarity with technical information, 
even reliable scientific evidence is more likely to be properly valued because the factfinder has 
the tools to perform this evaluation on their own. 
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litigation and the overcoming of the presumption of validity.355 
Relaxing the suggestion test’s rule of evidence just a little can help 
minimize Type II errors at this very early stage of the patent process. 
These reductions of errors come at a cost savings by reducing the 
burden of evidence production on examiners. 
C. Need for Express Adoption of the Rule 
As mentioned previously, one of the strongest possible critiques 
against this Article’s findings is that the Federal Circuit is not 
consciously implementing the rule as described. The nonobviousness 
cases over the three year period study just happen to support the 
Article’s descriptive findings. Put another way, the descriptive 
analysis in this Article is merely outcome determinative, where the 
cases are characterized in such a way to support the rule being 
discussed. The argument would be that the judges at the Federal 
Circuit never intended to create an evidentiary side to the suggestion 
test, and it is unlikely the rule will hold true in future cases decided 
by the court. 
Such a critique is valid. As previously noted, the court never 
explicitly articulated the rule described in this Article. The rule, in 
the Federal Circuit’s mind, may not truly exist. This possibility 
reduces the power behind the descriptive part of this study. 
Something was “found” that is not really there. 
The normative analysis, however, suggests that even if such a rule 
does not exist, it should—at least in the proposed modified form. 
Courts should consciously graft an evidentiary aspect to the 
suggestion test because doing so has many benefits. The rule reduces 
Type I errors, guarding against overvaluation, such as from 
hindsight, in the nonobviousness analysis. The rule, particularly if 
modified as this Article suggests by relaxing the rule in the USPTO 
setting, does not create many Type II errors and still allows 
undocumented suggestions to be considered in most cases. Because 
of this, the Federal Circuit, or better yet the Supreme Court in 
 
 355. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000); Nystrom v. TREX Co., 424 F.3d 1136, 1149 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005) (citing State Contracting & Eng’g Corp. v. Condotte Am., Inc., 346 F.3d 1057, 
1067 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). The result is that bad patents are issued. Cf. Mark A. Lemley, 
Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1495–97 (2001) (arguing 
that there should not be so much focus on ensuring that all patents issued are truly valid). 
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Teleflex, should expressly articulate the evidentiary-like part of the 
suggestion test. 
Even if the Federal Circuit is conscious of the evidentiary aspect 
of the suggestion test, express adoption by the Supreme Court or the 
Federal Circuit has its own benefits. Expressly setting forth the rule 
would answer much of the recent criticism arguing that only 
documented suggestions can prove obviousness. In addition, the 
transparency would make it easier for all patent observers to evaluate 
nonobviousness questions. Lower courts and the USPTO would 
know the law under which their nonobviousness decisions will be 
reviewed, and other patent observers could better evaluate a patent’s 
potential invalidity. 
VII. VIEWING OTHER PATENT LAW DOCTRINES THROUGH AN 
EVIDENTIARY LENS 
The evidentiary focus of this Article, while directly contributing 
to the current discourse on the nonobviousness requirement, can 
also prove useful in the examination of other patent doctrines. In 
particular, an evidentiary lens has both descriptive and normative 
powers. First, the operation of other traditionally substantive areas of 
patent law can be better understood when looked at through an 
evidentiary lens. Once the descriptive benefits of the evidentiary lens 
are realized, the normative part of the lens can help fully evaluate 
these patent doctrines. The use of evidence theory facilitates the 
complete evaluation of areas of patent law that have evidentiary 
facets. 
To provide an example of the use of the evidentiary lens beyond 
nonobviousness, two other substantive areas of patent law are briefly 
discussed: claim interpretation and inventorship. Both have 
evidentiary-like aspects that, when identified as such, give a fuller 
understanding to the two doctrines. In addition, the development of 
both doctrines can benefit from being evaluated under the evidence 
law goal of maximizing the likelihood of correct factual 
determinations. 
A. Claim Interpretation 
The first area of patent law that benefits from an evidentiary lens 
is patent claim interpretation. Patent claim interpretation is the 
process in which a court gives meaning to claim terms in order to 
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better define the invention being covered, thereby clarifying the 
scope of exclusivity.356 Claim interpretation is an essential first step in 
almost all patent inquiries—particularly validity and infringement.357 
While the main thrust of claim interpretation is substantive,358 
the concept of evidence plays a significant role. For starters, the 
Federal Circuit categorizes the various interpretative sources as either 
“intrinsic evidence” or “extrinsic evidence.” Intrinsic evidence are 
those information sources unique to the patent claim being 
construed, while extrinsic evidence are sources that are independent 
of the claim. A major portion of claim interpretation jurisprudence 
focuses on when either of these sources may be used by a court when 
construing a claim. In general, the use of intrinsic evidence is favored 
over that of extrinsic evidence.359 This preference is traditionally 
justified on public notice grounds.360 
The choice can also be viewed as being driven by evidentiary 
concerns.361 Extrinsic evidence usually comes in the form of expert 
 
 356. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 339 (1961) 
(“[T]he claims made in the patent are the sole measure of the grant . . . .” (citing Mercoid 
Corp. v. Mid-Continent Co., 320 U.S. 661, 667 (1944))). 
 357. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 374 (1996); TI Group 
Auto. Sys. (N. Am.), Inc. v. VDO N. Am., L.L.C., 375 F.3d 1126, 1139 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(“[The] validity analysis is a two-step procedure: ‘The first step involves the proper 
interpretation of the claims. The second step involves determining whether the limitations of 
the claims as properly interpreted are met by the prior art.’” (quoting Beachcombers, Int’l, 
Inc. v. WildeWood Creative Prods., Inc., 31 F.3d 1154, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 1994))). 
 358. See Cotropia, supra note 193, at 65–69 (explaining that one of claim interpretation’s 
main functions is to substantively define the patent’s scope). 
 359. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1996). In 
general, extrinsic evidence can only be used to define claim terms when a claim’s meaning 
remains ambiguous after consulting all three forms of intrinsic evidence. Id. at 73–74; see also 
Hormone Research Found., Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 904 F.2d 1558, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 360. See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583 (“[C]ompetitors are entitled to review the public 
record, apply the established rules of claim construction, ascertain the scope of the patentee’s 
claimed invention, and thus design around the claimed invention . . . . Allowing the public 
record to be altered or changed by extrinsic evidence introduced at trial, such as expert 
testimony, would make this right meaningless.”).  
 361. The Federal Circuit has attempted to take an evidentiary view before, but got 
caught up in the procedural devices surrounding technical rules of evidence. See Pitney Bowes, 
Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (noting that the court, 
while disfavoring the usage of extrinsic evidence, has “not set forth any rules regarding the 
admissibility of expert testimony into evidence”). 
  In a way, the evidentiary-like properties of claim interpretation are similar to those 
of the suggestion test. The court is not using them to deny the actual admissibility of 
disfavored evidence. Instead, the court simply instructs that one cannot “rely” on certain kinds 
of evidence. See id. (explaining that “it is improper to rely on extrinsic evidence” in certain 
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testimony or inventor testimony.362 This testimony is created 
specifically for the question of claim interpretation at hand. Because 
of the testimony’s time of creation and the testifier’s relation to one 
of the litigation parties, the testimony may be “colored by the 
motives of the parties” or “inspired by litigation.”363 These concerns 
are evidentiary ones. There is a worry about the veracity of such 
extrinsic evidence, and thus, it is usually not considered. While a 
concern for public notice justifies extrinsic evidence’s exclusion, 
recognition of evidentiary concerns provides a fuller story. In 
addition, once this evidentiary-like aspect to claim interpretation is 
identified, it may be tweaked to maximize its truth maximization 
purpose. For example, the recent debate over the consideration of 
certain types of extrinsic evidence, such as dictionaries, would have 
been better informed if an evidentiary angle would have also been 
fully considered.364 
B. Inventorship 
The concept of inventorship in patent law can also be viewed 
through an evidentiary lens. Patent law, in general, awards a patent 
to the first party to invent the claimed invention.365 The concept of 
invention is, however, not that simple—particularly when two parties 
claim to be the first to invent. The “priority of invention goes to the 
first party to reduce an invention to practice unless the other party 
can show that it was the first to conceive of the invention and that it 
 
circumstances). The doctrine is still operating in an evidentiary-like fashion, it is just not using 
an explicit rule of evidence. 
 362. See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583.  
 363. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (noting 
that “extrinsic evidence consisting of expert reports and testimony is generated at the time of 
and for the purpose of litigation and thus can suffer from bias that is not present in intrinsic 
evidence,” and that this “bias can be exacerbated if the expert is not one of skill in the relevant 
art or if the expert’s opinion is offered in a form that is not subject to cross-examination”); 
Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202–03 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(discussing what sets dictionaries, encyclopedias, and treatises apart from expert testimony). 
 364. Texas Digital started this part of the discussion, noting that dictionaries are insulated 
from biases that may damage other expert evidence such as expert testimony. Tex. Digital, 308 
F.3d at 1202–03. Whether this is the case or not was never fleshed out by the Federal Circuit 
or commentators. See, e.g., Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1319–23. Instead, the focus was more on the 
inclusion of dictionaries impact on public notice, certainty, the substantive claim scope, or 
information costs. See, e.g., Cotropia, supra note 193, at 102–16 (demonstrating that even the 
author failed to recognize the evidentiary lens).  
 365. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2000). 
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exercised reasonable diligence in later reducing that invention to 
practice.”366 Thus, inventorship depends on a finding of conception 
and a reduction to practice.367 
While the concept of inventorship is heavily substantive, focusing 
on mental and actual incarnations of a working invention, the 
doctrine also has an evidentiary side. If an inventor testifies to her 
own conception or reduction to practice, that testimony must be 
corroborated to establish inventorship.368 Uncorroborated testimony 
by the inventor cannot, by itself, establish inventorship.369 Some 
independent evidence, which can be circumstantial, must support the 
inventor’s testimony for a court or the USPTO to even consider 
whether inventorship has been established.370 The requirement for 
corroboration, therefore, creates an evidentiary-like rule that 
mandates a certain type of evidence be presented—corroborating 
evidence—before a decision maker can even consider making a 
substantive determination as to whether they are an inventor or not. 
Using an evidentiary lens not only better describes the 
corroboration requirement, but it also more accurately identifies the 
purpose of the requirement. Corroboration is required because the 
“inventor may have a motive to assert his claim in a self-serving 
manner.”371 Demanding corroboration before the substantive inquiry 
 
 366. Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citing Price v. Symsek, 
988 F.2d 1187, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). 
 367. “Conception is the ‘formation in the mind of the inventor, of a definite and 
permanent idea of the complete and operative invention . . . .’” See Hybritech, Inc. v. 
Monoclonal Antibodies, 802 F.2d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (quoting Coleman v. Dines, 
754 F.2d 353, 359 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). Reduction to practice can either be constructive, via the 
filing of a patent application, or actual. Id.; Michael F. Ciraolo, Application of the 
Corroboration Requirement to Interference Proceedings and Other Sections of 102, 84 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 531, 532 (2002). Actual reduction to practice entails creating an 
embodiment that includes all the limitations of the patent claim and recognizing that the 
embodiment works for its intended purpose. See UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 
647, 652 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Ciraolo, supra, at 532. 
 368. Cooper, 154 F.3d at 1330; Ciraolo, supra note 367, at 532–33.  
 369. See Allen v. Blaisdell, 196 F.2d 527, 529 (C.C.P.A. 1952) (noting that the 
requirement of corroboration “is inviolable and the tribunals of the Patent Office and the 
courts may not depart from it”). 
 370. See Cooper, 154 F.3d at 1330 (discussing the “rule of reason” that applies to 
circumstantial evidence that may corroborate an inventor’s testimony as to actual reduction to 
practice); Horton v. Stephens, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d 1245, 1248 (B.P.A.I. 1988) (noting that 
“independent evidence” is needed for corroboration).  
 371. Ciraolo, supra note 367, at 532. 
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begins “prevent[s] fraud and dishonesty.”372 The evidentiary-like 
corroboration rule was created to more reliably establish the 
credibility of the inventor’s testimony.373 Corroboration and the 
rules of evidence have similar goals—maximizing the likelihood of 
correct determinations. The inventorship case law has concluded that 
the potential for a possible inventor to lie about her own 
inventorship is so high that even testimony a factfinder may find 
credible by itself is not enough to legally establish inventorship. The 
testimony, in other words, has a high likelihood to be unreliable, and 
thus, the courts inject reliability by requiring the presentation of 
corroborating evidence before the issue of inventorship is handed 
over to the factfinder. This evidentiary look at inventorship and 
corroboration can prove extremely helpful in developing the specific 
requirements for corroboration.374 Since corroboration is an 
evidentiary creature, what is properly considered corroboration is 
better defined with the aid of evidence theory. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The descriptive study performed in this Article explains an 
apparent conflict in Federal Circuit nonobviousness law. The notion 
of a truly narrow suggestion test is dismissed, and an evidentiary-like 
aspect of the suggestion test is identified and described. This Article 
furthers its evidence focus through its examination of the suggestion 
test’s rule of evidence. The rule clearly reduces erroneous findings of 
obviousness, but, in its current formulation, does little to diminish, 
and may even exacerbate, the potential for erroneous findings of 
nonobviousness. With a little tweaking, specifically lowering the 
standard in the USPTO context, the suggestion test’s rule of 
evidence can be an even more potent tool for properly implementing 
the nonobviousness requirement and maintaining the balance 
between incentivizing invention and furthering competition. Because 
of these benefits, the Supreme Court in Teleflex should expressly 
 
 372. Id. at 532–33. 
 373. Id. at 532–34 (discussing the use of the “‘rule of reason’ analysis to determine if 
testimony given by a witness or documentary evidence support the claims made by the 
inventor”). 
 374. Currently, the courts adopt a “rule of reason” approach to “determine whether an 
inventor’s testimony . . . has been sufficiently corroborated.” Cooper, 154 F.3d at 1330 (citing 
Holmwood v. Sugavanam, 948 F.2d 1236, 1238 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). 
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articulate the rule of evidence aspect of the suggestion test described 
in this Article. 
In addition, the use of an evidentiary lens has benefits beyond 
the nonobviousness doctrine. Other areas of patent law, such as 
claim interpretation and inventorship, can benefit from evidence 
theory. An evidentiary lens helps explain the procedural-like aspects 
of some patent doctrines and prompts a better appreciation of a 
doctrine’s operation. Furthermore, the normative concepts in 
evidence law can aid in the evaluation and shaping of other parts of 
patent law. As a result, courts and commentators should look to 
apply evidentiary principles outside the context of the 
nonobviousness doctrine.  
 
 
